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Perpetrators vs. Auditors: Factors that Influence the Occurrence of Fraud and Audit 
Interventions 
Alyssa Sui Jing Ong 
 
This dissertation is comprised of three studies that examine two personalities that influence fraud 
occurrence and interventions that auditors can make to deter fraud and remain objective during 
the audit. 
 
The first study examines whether the rationalization attribute of the fraud triangle applies to 
individuals with high levels of trait impulsivity. Specifically, I seek to test the attributes of the 
fraud triangle- pressure, opportunity, and rationalization-in the context of trait-impulsivity. 
According to the fraud triangle theory, opportunity, pressure, and rationalization are present 
when individuals decide to engage in the fraudulent act. This theory might not hold true for 
impulsive individuals who have a different concept of time, prefer smaller, frequent rewards, and 
lack control when impulses arise. While I manipulate the pressure and opportunity attributes, I 
examine if individuals actually rationalize their fraud behavior. Prior research suggests that when 
individuals have the sudden urge to do something, individuals with high levels of trait 
impulsivity translate that impulse into behavior more rapidly than individuals with low levels of 
trait impulsivity. The results of the simulation suggest that when there was opportunity and 
pressure, impulsive individuals were quicker to make decisions to engage in or refrain from 
fraud behaviors than non-impulsive individuals. Impulsive individuals seem to bypass any 
consideration about the potential consequences (risk of detection, emotional discord, etc.) and 
this contrasts with non-impulsive individuals who are more deliberative, choosing to consider 
various factors beforehand. These perspectives interact with neutralization and rationalization of 
the fraud act. 
 
The second study examines how first impressions and auditor mindsets interact to influence 
auditors’ risk judgments. Auditors form first impressions as they interact with client personnel 
while gathering audit evidence. Prior first-impression research suggests that individuals’ first 
impressions influence their subsequent judgments through a subconscious process which makes 
it difficult to avoid biased judgments associated with them. In auditing, we expect a positive 
(negative) first impression to decrease (increase) auditor objectivity and cause auditors to 
become less (more) sensitive to misstatement risk; our findings from an experiment with 
practicing auditors support this expectation. Importantly, we also show that encouraging auditors 
to focus on being effective without concern for audit costs (i.e., an effectiveness mindset) 
attenuates first impression biases relative to encouraging them to focus on audit costs (i.e., an 
efficiency mindset). Given that client inquiry is an important component of the audit, these 
findings have direct implications for auditor effectiveness. 
 
Lastly, study three focuses on how auditors can potentially deter fraud. When auditors perceive 
fraud risk during an audit, AU 316 (AICPA 2002) recommends varying the nature, timing, or 
extent of audit procedures. However, previous studies indicate that while auditors typically vary 
the extent and timing of audit procedures, they do not vary the nature of audit procedures, which 




procedures is that it may also deter fraud. Auditors create ambiguity when they vary audit 
procedures. As most individuals are averse to ambiguity, varying audit procedures for each audit 
cycle will create ambiguity for clients and make it difficult to predict the testing auditors would 
select. Consequently, it would raise the perceived level of difficulty for individuals to commit 
fraud. This study examines whether creating ambiguity by varying the nature of audit procedures 
deters fraud, and whether this deterrence is dependent on individuals’ narcissism. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to knowledge on fraud, specifically as it applies to 
fraud occurrence and audit intervention. Most of what is known about the fraudulent act is descriptive 
(Beasley et al. 2014, ACFE 2016). We know that fraud perpetrators are most likely male, in his late 30s or 
early 40s, and is college educated (ACFE 2016). However, this does not mean that everyone who fits into 
this profile has committed fraud or will commit fraud. The anecdotal 10-80-10 Rule of Ethics states that 
10% of the population will always commit fraud when the opportunity presents itself, 80% of the population 
might commit fraud depending on the circumstances, and the remaining 10% of the population will never 
commit fraud (AGA 2017). Personality impacts an individual’s behavior (Collins and Schmidt 1993) and 
could be associated with individuals’ in the 80% category’s decision to engage in fraud behaviors. A deeper 
understanding of what personality characteristics are associated with individuals’ choice to perpetrate a 
fraud can contribute to our knowledge on why some individuals will commit fraud when the opportunity is 
present while some others will refrain from doing so. Specifically for this dissertation, I examine how 
impulsivity and narcissism affects individuals’ actions when the opportunity to commit fraud is present.  
Next, I examine how auditors’ first impression of the client can affect the audit, especially when fraudsters 
are known to manage their impression when auditors are present (Sheridan 2016).  
Auditors are in constant contact with clients to gather information during the audit. Through this 
process, auditors may meet with new client personnel throughout the audit of a familiar client. It is also 
normal for auditors to be assigned to new engagements, thus meeting with members of client personnel for 
the first time. Audit standards emphasize the importance of risk assessment in auditing and the need for 
auditors to remain objective (AICPA 2014; PCAOB 2007; AICPA 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). However, 
auditors can be biased by their first impressions of the client. Anecdotally, fraudsters have been known to 




Sam Antar had his employees wine and dine the auditors and encouraged his female employees to get 
friendly with them. He admitted that “the chumminess helped us become more likable to our auditors and 
corrode their professional skepticism” (Antar 2018). In the ZZZZ Best fraud scheme, Barry Minkow 
successfully manipulated the auditors by establishing social contacts with them and their wives, knowing 
that if the auditors’ wives saw him as a “nice kid”, they could defend him if the auditors express concern 
about the company (Matulich and Currie 2016, p.84). The first impression formation is a subconscious 
process and occurs almost instantaneously (Willis and Todorov 2006). In this dissertation I examine how 
auditors can mitigate this first impression bias and stay objective when carrying out tasks on the audit plan.  
Audit standards recommend that auditors vary audit procedures when there is a risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud (AICPA 2002). However, prior research suggests that auditors rarely make 
changes to the audit plan (Zimbelman 1997; Glover et al. 2003). In addition to helping with fraud detection, 
the variation in audit procedures could also assist with fraud deterrence. This change in audit procedures 
would make things less predictable for potential fraudsters and possibly reduce the rate of fraud occurrence. 
 In this dissertation, I contribute to the fraud occurrence and audit intervention efforts by conducting 
three different experiments. First, in Chapter Two, I conduct an experiment to examine if the rationalization 
attribute of the fraud triangle applies to individuals who are impulsive by presenting individuals with the 
opportunity to steal when pressure and internal audit rates are manipulated. Empirically examining whether 
the rationalization attribute of the fraud triangle applies to impulsive individuals will contribute to our 
understanding of the Fraud Triangle (Albrecht 1991) and situations in which it does not apply. Second, I 
conduct an experiment examining how first impressions can bias auditor judgment and how being in a 
certain mindset can mitigate this bias in Chapter Three. Fraud perpetrators may distract auditors from the 
fraud by providing auditors with a positive first impression, causing auditors to make an incorrect judgment 
and lowering their fraud risk assessments of the company. Being in the right mindset from the inception of 




experiment to examine how auditor intervention of varying the nature of audit procedures can lead to fraud 
deterrence. Individuals are generally averse to ambiguity (Ellsberg 1961). The ambiguity created when 
auditors frequently change the nature of audit procedures can potentially serve as a deterrent, reducing the 
likelihood of fraud occurrence as individuals are uncomfortable when ambiguity is present. This study is 
presented in Chapter Four. 
 This dissertation is organized as follows: chapters 2 through 4 include specific details of the three 
studies briefly mentioned above. Each chapter contains an introduction to the study, overview of the 
relevant literature and hypotheses development, methodology, results, and discussion of limitations and 
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CHAPTER TWO: NEUTRALIZATION VS. RATIONALIZATION: DOES THE FRAUD 
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 The General Theory of Crime (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990) states that self-control is an important 
element that influences individuals’ decision to commit fraud. However, this does not mean that individuals 
with low levels of self-control will commit fraud when given the opportunity (Pratt 2015). This finding 
indicates that there are other factors that influence individuals’ decision to commit fraud beyond their level 
of self-control. In interviews with convicted fraudsters, Cressey (1950,1953) observed that fraudsters 
rationalize the action internally to reduce emotional discord. The fraud triangle theory (Albrecht 1991) 
posits that individuals rationalize before the first fraudulent act. Impulsive individuals act without much 
deliberation (Collins 2017). As such, it is possible that impulsive individuals would not rationalize before 
committing fraud. Trompeter et al. (2014) suggest that there should be more empirical studies examining 
individuals’ personality as it relates to economic crime. Specifically, Trompeter et al. (2014) stress that 
accounting research that incorporates work from the areas of psychology and organizational behavior may 
be beneficial to broaden our understanding of individuals’ perception of opportunity. In addition, Anand et 
al. (2015) call for fraud to be studied with different methods because it is perpetrated in many ways by 
people who have different personality characteristics, background, thought process, etc. In this study, I 
investigate whether the fraud triangle, specifically the attribute of rationalization, is applicable to impulsive 
individuals.  
 Impulsivity is a trait that influences individuals’ behaviors throughout a multitude of situations and 
is associated with the ability to control actions and thoughts (Barratt 1983). Impulsivity is defined as a “type 
of behavior characterized by a tendency to act impulsively or without prior reflection or thought” (Collins 
2017, Romer et al. 2009). Hofmann et al. (2007) state that every day, “people are tempted by their impulses, 
urges, and cravings.”- while others are perceived to be more virtuous, have more self-control and are able to 
consistently ward off impulse temptations and keep their sights on long-term goals and standards. Further, 




individual differences in trait impulsivity is important as they depict a persistent susceptibility for a host of 
potentially problematic behaviors due to a lack of control (Friese and Hofmann 2009). In addition to acting 
without prior reflection or thought, impulsive individuals perceive time differently- Wittmann and Paulus 
(2007) find that individuals with high trait impulsivity overestimate the duration of time intervals in time 
judgment tasks. They also find that when compared to non-impulsive individuals, impulsive individuals 
choose to receive immediate, smaller rewards over delayed, greater rewards. In the context of fraud, 
impulsive individuals might be more inclined to engage in asset misappropriation fraud that has a smaller 
reward and a faster conversion to cash than non-impulsive individuals. Personality traits can be used to 
predict behavior (Paunonen and Ashton 2001) and prior work in white-collar crime indicate the importance 
of understanding personality traits that could influence individuals to commit fraud (Ramamoorti 2008, 
Alalehto 2003, Perri 2011). However, in the area of fraud research, there is also a need to go beyond 
personality traits and study situations in which the fraudulent act occurs (Anand et al. 2015). I hypothesize 
that individuals’ response to fraud behavior will vary depending on their level of trait impulsivity. 
 The Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM) (Strack and Deutsch 2004) is a conceptual framework for 
the materialization of impulsive behavior that consists of reflective and impulsive mechanisms which jointly 
influence behavior. Based on this model, impulses are traced to an associative network from long-term 
memory. Once an object is encountered, affect that is associated with the object is immediately activated 
and these affect associations are precursors of impulsive behavior (Strack and Deutsch 2004, Hofmann et al. 
2008). The impulsive system activates behavior without much thought whereas the reflective system 
activates behavior after deliberation of a future state and evaluation of the probability with which the state 
will be accomplished through the behavior (Strack et al. 2006). The reflective system has the ability to 
override the behavioral intentions in the impulsive system when not lacking in resources and motivation 
(Hofmann et al. 2008). As there are two-systems in the RIM that can influence behavior, the specific system 




differ between individuals with varying levels of trait impulsivity. I predict that individuals more strongly 
influenced by trait impulsivity will commit fraud by activating behavior through the impulsive system 
without much deliberation about the consequence and rationalization. 
 I examined individuals’ fraud behavior (willingness to commit fraud and presence of 
rationalization/neutralization) when precursors of fraud (pressure and opportunity) are present in the context 
of trait impulsivity and the Reflective-Impulsive Model. I designed a 2x2x2 simulation, collecting data from 
306 participants. In the simulation, participants had the opportunity to decide to misappropriate company 
assets via an expense reimbursement fraud for personal gain. I hypothesize and find that unlike non-
impulsive individuals, impulsive individuals spend less time when making decisions to engage in or refrain 
from fraud behavior when financial pressure is high compared to when pressure is low. Given the 
opportunity to commit fraud, impulsive individuals are also more likely than non-impulsive individuals to 
ignore factors such as internal audit tests and financial pressure. Most importantly, I show that when 
precursors to fraud are present, impulsive individuals take less time than non-impulsive individuals when 
deciding to engage in or refrain from fraud behavior. This demonstrates the lack of deliberation on behalf of 
impulsive individuals before making the decision to commit fraud, suggesting that the belief that pressure, 
opportunity, and rationalization have to be present before a fraud is committed might not be true for 
impulsive individuals. 
This study makes several contributions to extant literature. First, by examining whether the 
rationalization attribute of the fraud triangle applies to impulsive individuals, I build upon the existing 
forensic accounting and fraud examination literature by providing new insights into how personality affects 
individuals’ willingness to commit fraud. The findings also provide a foundation for future fraud models 
that encompass impulsive individuals. The ACFE’s 2016 Report to the Nations list the different methods 
that fraud perpetrators use to conceal fraud and reduce the chances of detection (ACFE 2016). Methods used 




Fraudsters can alter documents as they engage in the planned fraudulent act or engage in the fraudulent act 
first and execute a concealment plan by destroying or creating documents later to “cover their tracks”. 
Knowledge of how impulsive individuals’ thought processes differ from others before the fraud behavior 
can provide insights into fraud concealment methods and pave the way for more fraud concealment 
research. Second, by looking at the reflective and impulsive systems that influence the activation of fraud 
behavior, I respond to the call of Anand et al. (2015) to study the situations in which the fraudulent act 
occurs. Examining impulsivity and the conceptual framework through the RIM when fraud decisions are 
made also answers the call by Trompeter et al. (2014) to use personality traits to enhance our understanding 
of the interaction between situational and individual factors of the fraudulent act.  
 The remainder of this study proceeds as follows: Section II provides a background review of the 
relevant literature and the development of hypotheses. Section III is a general outline of the research method 
and the experimental design of the study. Section IV provides results of the experimental study and Section 
V includes a discussion and concluding remarks. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Fraud Perpetrators  
 Hermanson et al. (2017) identify the first time offender as the “situational fraudster” who typically is 
a middle-aged male, middle class, well-educated, and a trusted employee in the company. When the fraud is 
discovered, the fraudulent act is considered “out-of-character” for the situational fraudster. Dorminey et al. 
(2010) also identify perpetrators who are constantly looking for opportunities to commit fraud as “predator 
fraudsters”. Fraudulent acts can be committed alone or in collusion with others. Solo frauds are less costly 
and the perpetrator is typically older, more-educated when compared to perpetrators of collusive frauds 
(Bishop et al. 2016). The ACFE’s 2016 Report to the Nations report that over 50% of the cases involve 




I examine solo frauds perpetrated by the situational fraudster. Below is a discussion of fraud models that 
apply to solo frauds.  
Fraud Models 
Cressey (1953) posits that three attributes are necessary for individuals to commit fraud: (1) 
pressure, (2) opportunity, and (3) rationalization. This theory is now commonly known as the “fraud 
triangle” (Albrecht 1991), depicted in Figure 2-1, and subsequent models and studies of fraud such as the 
Fraud Scale (Albrecht et al. 1984), the M.I.C.E. acronym (Kranacher et al. 2011), the Fraud Diamond 
(Wolfe and Hermanson 2004), the Fully Ascribed Meta-Model of White-Collar Crime (Dorminey et al. 
2012), and the revised Fraud Triangle (Boyle et al. 2018) modify and build on Cressey’s original idea. The 
revised Fraud Triangle modified the rationalization attribute of the triangle, defining it as capability to 
include fraudsters’ personal characteristics (Boyle et al. 2018). However, the ability to rationalize fraud 
remains a critical part of the capability attribute. All these fraud models establish that for solo, accidental 
fraudsters, the rationalization attribute must be present before fraud occurs. I am building on fraud 
examination and forensic accounting literature by examining how the rationalization attribute applies to 
impulsive individuals. Gaining insight into individuals’ thought process when the idea of committing fraud 
is planted will shed light on how impulsive individuals differ from non-impulsive individuals when making 
decisions to commit fraud.  
[Insert Figure 2-1 about here] 
Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM) 
 The Reflective-Impulsive Model is a dual-process conceptual framework that “explains social 
behavior as a joint function of reflective and impulsive processes” (Strack and Deutsch 2004, p.220). Dual-
processing models draw on the belief that individuals have memory systems that process information in 
fundamentally different ways (Smith and DeCoster 2000, McClelland, McNaughton, and O’Reilly 1995, 




knowledge that is accumulated from experiences and the use of that knowledge to process information 
quickly and automatically when similar situations occur. On the other hand, the rule-based processing mode 
incorporates symbolically represented rules structured by language and logic as the basis to processing 
decisions and occurs optionally when cognitive capacity and motivation are present (Smith and DeCoster 
2000). A psychology concept similar to the associative processing mode and the impulsive system under the 
RIM is heuristics, defined as “methods for arriving at satisfactory solutions with modest amounts of 
computation” (Simon 1990, p.11). Individuals use heuristics to reduce the cognitive load associated with 
decision making (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). In contrast, need for cognition refers to individuals’ 
tendency to participate in deep, engaging thoughts to understand and make sense of experiences (Cacioppo, 
Petty, and Kao 1984, Cacioppo and Petty 1982, Cohen et al. 1955). Individuals with a high need for 
cognition can be described as thinkers and, in the context of dual-processing models, would have the rule-
based processing mode as their dominant processing system. 
This dual-process RIM model assumes that behavior is controlled by the reflective and impulsive 
systems, each with the capability to run in parallel, interact with each other, and operate based on different 
principles. The impulsive system is always engaged in processing whereas the reflective system may be 
disengaged depending on cognitive capacity or levels of arousal. A stimulus enters the reflective system 
when intensity is great (Strack, Werth and Deutsch 2006). When this happens, the impulsive and reflective 
systems are running in parallel. The end point for both the reflective and impulsive system is the behavioral 
schemata that activates behavior (Strack and Deutsch 2004). When behavioral schemata from the impulsive 
and reflective systems are at odds, the behavior that is activated depends on the relative strength of the 
schemata activation. Figure 2-2 is a visual representation of the RIM adapted from Strack and Deutsch 
(2004).  




Environmental/external cues (e.g., observing a bakery with a cake at the display window), is 
perceived by an individual and enters both the reflective and impulsive processing systems. The impulsive 
system activates behavior (e.g., walking into the bakery to purchase some cake) by linking the perceived 
external cues with behavioral schemata based on previous affective associations (e.g., the anticipation of the 
pleasure of sweet taste and smell of cakes from prior experience). This spreading activation occurs 
efficiently in the impulsive system, using a minimal amount of cognitive resources (Deutsch and Strack 
2008). Strack and Deutsch (2004) also find that the impulsive system is focused on pleasure-seeking and 
pain prevention. During the operation of the impulsive system, it generates internal cues activating affective, 
non-affective feelings, and behavioral tendencies which are all perceived by the reflective system (Deutsch 
and Strack 2008, Hofmann et al. 2007). The reflective system uses the external and internal cues to form 
judgment (e.g., should the cake be purchased if he/she is on a diet), activate the behavioral schemata 
through a process of intending (Gollwitzer 1999) that automatically activates the schemata if the behavior 
has not already been executed, which leads to behavior (e.g. purchase of the cake as a reward, or walking 
away from the bakery empty-handed to keep up with diet goals).  The reflective system requires a great 
amount of cognitive resources, operates at a slower pace (Strack and Deutsch 2004, Hofmann et al. 2007), 
fulfills executive functions, deliberate plans in new situations, and comes up with alternative plans when 
habits fail (Lieberman et al. 2002). In short, the reflective system initiates behavioral schemata after 
deliberating on the action drawing from prior knowledge, facts, and values whereas the impulsive system 
initiates behavioral schemata through fast activation of associative links between contents (Strack et al. 
2006, Strack and Deutsch 2004). The specific schemata that ultimately leads to behavior (e.g., purchasing 
the cake or not) depends on the relative strength of schemata activation (e.g. does the reflective or impulsive 
system have a stronger influence in this situation?). 
From the RIM perspective, the reflective system makes judgments and evaluations, puts together 




individual’s long-term expectations (Hofmann et al. 2008). In other words, the reflective system is like an 
individual’s self-control center. In the fraud setting, most models assume when there is pressure, individuals 
consider the opportunity to commit the fraud, the ability to conceal the fraud, and will neutralize to justify 
the act. Using a dual systems model like the RIM, this would translate into the use of the reflective system 
to fully consider the opportunity before the activation of behavioral schemata to commit or not to commit 
the fraudulent act. Just as some individuals might be tempted to commit fraud when they identify the 
opportunity, people are constantly tempted with impulses daily (Hofmann et al. 2007). Individuals face 
situations where their uninhibited impulses interfere with long-term goals, standards, or moral conflict 
(Bogg and Roberts 2004, Carver 2005, Tangney et al. 2004). A process-oriented approach such as the RIM 
provides more information on when and why individual’s decision to act based on impulse is determined by 
reflective and impulsive influences (Hofmann et al. 2008). Compared to individuals who are non-impulsive, 
impulses translate more readily into behavior through the impulsive system when individuals are impulsive 
(Hofmann et al. 2009). Frederick (2005) created the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), a set of three 
questions intended to measure individual’s processing system preference and “assess individuals’ ability to 
restrain an impulsive wrong answer in favor of a reflective right answer”. As the CRT measures the 
reflective processing preference, Cueva et al. (2015) adapted the CRT measure by defining the impulsive 
answers to the same questions from Frederick (2005) thereby creating the iCRT measure. Using the CRT 
questions, there are now two sets of possible answers. A set of answers (CRT) which indicate individuals 
prefer the reflective processing system and a set of impulsive answers (iCRT), which individuals preferring 
the impulsive processing system gravitate towards. Individuals who’s dominant processing system is the 
impulsive system are more likely to be impulsive than individuals who prefer the reflective system. 
Impulsivity (Trait) 
 Every major system of personality, such as psychotism and sensation-seeking, has a component of 




feeling and temptation to obtain a reward (hedonic thrill) without much consideration for rules (Romer et al. 
2009). Trait impulsivity is expected to gradually decrease with age (Steinberg et al. 2008). Prior research on 
individual differences treat impulsivity as a multifaceted construct with dimensions like the inability to stop 
an action once a decision has been made, high sensitivity to immediate rewards, low tolerance for delayed 
rewards, and the lack of deliberation of consequences when responding to impulses (De Wit, 2009, Romer 
et al. 2009, Gullo and Dawe 2008, Whiteside and Lynam 2003). Wittman and Paulus (2007) find that 
impulsive individuals perceive time differently from non-impulsive individuals. They tend to perceive that a 
certain duration of time is longer than it is in reality and discount the value of future rewards, for example, 
preferring a gain of $166 now (present value) over a gain of $482 10 years from now (future value of $166 
at 11.25%), more than individuals who have more self-control (Wittmann and Paulus 2007). This difference 
in time perception causes impulsive individuals to choose smaller, instant rewards ($0.01 every 2 seconds) 
more often over future rewards ($0.24 every 32 seconds) even though those future rewards may be greater 
(Wittmann and Paulus 2007). An individual with high trait impulsivity should have problems with keeping 
impulses under control once the impulse is activated and have a lower level of intelligence (Shamosh et al. 
2008). Therefore, impulses that are activated automatically in a particular situation should proceed easily 
into behavior for individuals with high levels of trait impulsivity (Friese and Hofmann 2009).  
Impulses encourage the need for immediate gratification (Strack et al. 2006) and different 
individuals respond to the same set of impulses differently (Hoffmann et al. 2008). For example, a group of 
people are meeting in a room with a bowl of candy in sight. Remembering from past experiences that candy 
tastes great, makes them feel good, and evoke happy memories, all of them are tempted by the same set of 
impulses. However, different people in the room will respond differently. Some might choose to take 
multiple pieces throughout the meeting before feeling like the need is satisfied, some might take one piece 
and stop there, whereas others might choose to refrain from the candy- reminding themselves of their goal to 




faster than non-impulsive individuals –heading straight towards the candy bowl at the very start of the 
meeting. Bringing it to the fraud setting, most individuals have a positive association with money (i.e., it is 
better to have more money than what is currently owned) but when given the opportunity to steal, not 
everyone will engage in fraudulent behaviors. Given the opportunity to increase their financial position, 
impulsive individuals might “dive in head first” compared to non-impulsive individuals. The time taken to 
act on the opportunity would be much less for impulsive individuals compared to non-impulsive individuals 
due to the lack of deliberation. This leads to the discussion on the conditions that increase the likelihood of 
fraud occurrence.  
Precursors of Fraud  
According to the Cressey Theory, pressure to commit fraud can arise from having a “non-shareable 
financial need”, to maintain fraudsters’ image in society, or to have a better quality of life (Dorminey et al. 
2012, Cressey 1953). When financial pressure is high, individuals are more likely to commit fraud 
compared to individuals with low financial pressure. Opportunity is perceived as the ability to commit the 
act itself and the ability to conceal the act to prevent detection (Trompeter et al. 2014, Dorminey et al. 
2012). When individuals’ spot a weakness in internal controls of a company, opportunity is thought to be 
present as there is a possibility to commit the act given weak or overlooked internal controls. Individuals 
with high trait impulsivity will be quicker to make a decision regarding this opportunity than individuals 
with low trait impulsivity. Also, individuals’ response to this internal control weakness would depend on the 
influence of the reflective/impulsive processing system. Fraud literature posit that for fraud to occur, 
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization have to be present (Cressey 1953). The third attribute, 
rationalization, is discussed next. 
Justification: Rationalization vs. Neutralization 
Dissonance happens when individuals have to make decisions between two beliefs or actions that are 




greatest when the two options hold equal appeal. The theory of cognitive dissonance states that when 
individuals have two cognitions that are inconsistent with the other, individuals will tend to seek consistency 
among the cognitions to eliminate the dissonance (Festinger 1962). Rationalization and neutralization are 
ways individuals use to reduce or eliminate dissonance. Rationalization is the need for the perpetrator to 
normalize the act, justify that the act is for a greater good, to reduce the emotional discord and remain in 
their “moral comfort zone” (Trompeter et al. 2014, Dorminey et al. 2012, Cressey 1953). Prior research 
suggest that justification of the act can occur before or after the fraudulent act (Dorminey et al. 2012, 
Fritsche 2005, Schonbach 1990, Snyder and Higgins 1988, Sykes and Matza 1957). In the forensic 
accounting literature, Albrecht (1991) described rationalization as occurring before the first fraud act. In the 
areas of social psychology and sociology, neutralization, a term that is rarely used in forensic accounting or 
fraud examination literature, is thought to take place before individuals engage in norm-contradicting 
behavior (Fritsche 2005); rationalization, on the other hand, is assumed to occur after the behavior that goes 
against social norm is executed to normalize the act (Sykes and Matza 1957) and to maintain a sense of 
control (Schonbach 1990; Snyder and Higgins 1988). Throughout the rest of the paper, I refer to 
neutralization as occurring before individuals make decisions to engage in norm-contradicting behavior and 
rationalization as occurring after the decision has been made.  
General Theory of Crime 
The General Theory of Crime (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990) asserts that self-control is the crucial 
element in influencing individuals’ decision to commit crime. Individuals with low self-control are thought 
to be more likely to commit crime compared to individuals with high self-control because they have a lower 
ability to resist reacting in accordance to their impulses (Pratt and Cullen 2005, Mischel et al. 1989). This 
perspective is consistent with the concept of reflective vs. impulsive acts and trait impulsivity for 
individuals that might commit fraud depending on the situation. The 10-80-10 Rule (most likely anecdotal) 




commit fraud given the opportunity (predators), and 80 percent of the population could choose to commit 
fraud depending on the situation (situational fraudsters) (AGA 2017).  Although prior research has shown 
that individuals with low self-control are more likely to commit fraud when compared to other individuals, 
when presented with the opportunity most will not commit fraud (Perkins and Wanserski 2017, Pratt 2015). 
Pratt (2015) also finds that individuals who have the same level of self-control differ on their display of self-
control variability- they could be deliberative in some situations and impulsive in others. This is an indicator 
that beyond his/her level of self-control, there is more that affects an individual’s decision to commit fraud 
especially when the individual belongs to the 80 percent of the population under the 10-80-10 Rule. 
Together, research on the fraud triangle and the General Theory of Crime suggests that even when 
all three attributes are present for an individual, there is a possibility that he will commit fraud or vice versa. 
This implies that there are other individual-level factors, such as individuals’ cognitive processing system 
and trait impulsivity that are influencing the activation or inhibition of fraud behavior. The assumption that 
all attributes of the fraud triangle have to be present before a fraudulent act can occur implies that the 
fraudulent act has to be premeditated. If so, the situational fraudster has conducted a comprehensive analysis 
of the situation before carrying out the fraudulent act, using the reflective system from the Reflective-
Impulsive Model to put together an action plan (Strack and Deutsch 2004) and neutralizing any emotional 
discord to stay in their moral comfort zone for this new situation. On the other hand, impulsive individuals 
tend to act first when the impulse arises, using the impulsive system and giving little consideration to 
whether the fraud can be detected or justifying their actions beforehand. Any emotional discord or 
justification for their actions would take place after, suggesting that impulsive individuals engage in 
rationalization, not neutralization. 
Hypotheses Development 
Theory predicts that when the opportunity to commit fraud is high due to the low likelihood of 




fraud is low due to the high likelihood of detection, individuals will be less likely to engage in fraud 
behaviors. Opportunities to commit fraud are not readily available or apparent to individuals on a day-to-day 
basis. When the opportunity to commit fraud arises, impulsive individuals will be more focused on the 
chance to increase personal gain over the likelihood of detection compared to non-impulsive individuals. 
Impulsive individuals are also more likely to ignore financial pressure when the opportunity to commit 
fraud is present when compared to non-impulsive individuals. When individuals ignore factors like pressure 
and likelihood of detection, focusing only on increasing their financial position when making decisions to 
commit fraud, neutralization does not occur. I predict that impulsive individuals will focus on their financial 
status and disregard other factors such as pressure and detection. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: When the opportunity presents itself, impulsive individuals are 
more likely to focus on their financial status when choosing to 
engage or refrain from fraudulent behavior compared to non-
impulsive individuals. 
 
All else equal, theory states that when the pressure to commit fraud is high due to the lack of 
resources to maintain a certain lifestyle, individuals will be more likely to engage in fraud behaviors. When 
the pressure to commit fraud is low due to the low financial pressure, individuals will be less likely to 
engage in fraud behaviors. Impulsive individuals in the high pressure condition will more readily engage in 
fraudulent behaviors than impulsive individuals in the low pressure condition. In contrast with impulsive 
individuals, non-impulsive individuals will deliberate more before arriving at their decision to engage in 
fraudulent behavior when pressure is high than when pressure is low. Impulsive individuals in the high 
pressure condition will take less time to arrive at their decision to engage in fraudulent behavior when 
compared to impulsive individuals in the low pressure condition. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: When pressure is high, impulsive individuals will take less time 
when deciding to engage or refrain from fraudulent behavior than 





Impulsive individuals are quick to take action when making decisions, rationalizing their behavior to 
engage in fraud behaviors after the act has taken place if the act contradicts with their personal beliefs. 
Consequently, the time taken to arrive at each decision to engage in fraud behavior is shorter than non-
impulsive individuals, who will take more time to think about the decision because they need to neutralize 
any dissonance about the decision beforehand. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: When precursors to fraud are present, impulsive individuals 
will choose to engage or refrain from fraud behaviors in less time 
than non-impulsive individuals. 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHODS 
Participants and Compensation 
 In this study I examine individuals’ reaction given the opportunity to commit a reimbursement fraud. 
The 2016 ACFE Report to the Nations report that perpetrators for all the frauds in the sample came from 17 
different departments (ACFE 2016). As any individual working for a company may be in a position to 
submit reimbursements, participants can be from any background making Amazon Mechanical Turk an 
appropriate platform to recruit participants. 426 individuals were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) to participate in Part One of this two-part study. The requirements listed for participation in this 
study on MTurk were (1) individuals had to be in the United States and (2) their MTurk approval rating had 
to be 98% and above.  
In Part One, participants completed the pre-simulation questions and in Part Two, participants 
completed the simulation. Participants were awarded $0.01 for their efforts in Part One and were promised a 
bonus of $0.50 when they completed Part Two. Participants’ were not able to gain access to Part 2 of the 
study if they completed the Part One survey multiple times or if they were located outside the United States. 
Seven observations were rejected due to a violation of the location requirement and another 17 observations 
were rejected because the participants completed the same study more than once. All other participants 




Part One was completed, Part Two of the study was made available to the rest of the pre-qualified 
participants on MTurk. Participants were notified about Part Two when it was available and follow-up 
emails were sent to remind participants about this opportunity. Participants received $1 as a reward for 
completing Part Two, the aforementioned $0.50 bonus for completing both parts of the study, and an 
additional bonus based on their performance in the simulation from Part Two. The additional bonus was 
earned in Lira during the simulation and then converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 15 Lira. A 
detailed description of how participants earned Lira in the simulation is provided under the design section. 
The highest amount a participant received from the study was $11.18 and the lowest amount paid to a 
participant was $1.51. 306 participants completed both parts of the study. I tested the hypotheses using the 
306 complete observations. Table 2-1 presents the participant demographics of the 306 participants. 
[Insert Table 2-1 Here] 
Design 
 A 2 (within) x 2 (within) x2 (between) experiment was designed to involve a manipulation of the 
opportunity to commit fraud (within: high or low), the pressure to commit fraud (within: high or low), and 
trait impulsivity (between: high or low). Data were collected electronically via Qualtrics survey platform 
and MouselabWEB, a process tracing tool that was used to monitor the information acquisition process of 
individuals when they were making decisions. A description of the study was posted on MTurk and all 
individuals who met the two requirements set for the study were able to access the Qualtrics link to 
complete Part One. In Part One, participants completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, part of the 
Narcissism Spectrum Scale1, the Social Value Orientation Slider Scale, the Risk Propensity Scale, the 
Cognitive Reflection Test, and the Berlin Numeracy Test. Participants were also asked to provide 
                                                          
1 The Narcissism Spectrum Scale (NSS) (Malkin 2015) is a 9-item scale measuring three types of narcissism: echoism, healthy 
narcissism, and extreme narcissism. Echoism describes individuals who focus more on others at the expense of their own needs. 
Healthy narcissists are confident, capable of helping others and requesting for help. Extreme narcissists are manipulative, self-
seeking, argumentative, and have fluctuating self-esteem. In this study I am interested in in extreme narcissists therefore I use the 




information regarding their age, gender, years of work experience, and indicate if they have had any 
interaction with internal auditors in the past.  
In Part Two of the study, participants read the case instructions and were asked to assume that they 
were an employee of WebSmart, Inc., a marketing company, and their job required them to travel each 
period. The case study was adapted from Holderness and Sultan (2014). Participants had to correctly answer 
questions about the case study before moving on to the simulation. They clicked on a link from Qualtrics to 
open a MouselabWEB webpage containing the simulation. The simulation in MouselabWEB lasted 10 
periods. At the beginning of the simulation participants were given a small endowment of 25 Lira. In each 
period, participants had the opportunity to commit expense reimbursement fraud or not commit fraud at all. 
If they chose to commit fraud, they had the chance of adding an additional 10 Lira to their bank balance. 
They received a salary of 35 Lira for each period, and they could see their bank balance during each period 
in the simulation. Information about the household expenses (pressure) and the percentage of expense 
reimbursement requests selected for internal audit (opportunity) for the period were hidden behind 
MouselabWEB boxes. Participants could see what information the boxes contained, but the specific values 
were only visible when they moused over those boxes. The software records the time participants mouse in 
and out of the boxes and the time participants spend on the two options. In every period, there was a 20% 
chance that the internal audit personnel would detect the fraud. If a participant chose to commit fraud during 
any of the 10 periods and it was detected by the auditors, an additional 10 Lira was deducted from the 
participant’s bank balance for each period fraud was discovered. At the end of 10 periods, participants were 
directed back to Qualtrics to complete the final section of the study. In the final section, participants 
answered some post-experiment questions in Qualtrics. Participant bonus based on the simulation was 




the rate of $1 for every 15 Lira. All compensation for participation and the bonus based on performance in 
the simulation was paid through MTurk. Figure 2-3 is a visual depiction of the experiment sequence.2 
[Insert Figure 2-3 about here] 
First Independent Variable - Precursors of Fraud: Pressure  
 Participants received a 35 Lira salary for each period they were employed and received information 
about their annual household expenses in one of the MouselabWEB boxes. At any point in time during the 
simulation participants were able to see the balance in their bank account. Annual household expenses could 
be higher or lower than their salary for the period. In periods of high pressure, household expenses were 40 
Lira, which was 5 Lira higher than their 35 Lira salary. When pressure was low, their household expenses 
were 30 Lira. They were only able to view the amount of household expenses incurred when they moved 
their cursor over the specific household expenses box. In the simulation, it was possible for participant’s 
bank balance to be negative.  
Second Independent Variable - Precursors of Fraud: Opportunity  
 The participant’s opportunity to successfully commit expense reimbursement fraud was related to 
the extent that the internal audit department examined reimbursement records. The participants were 
informed that the internal audit department has many responsibilities and does not examine every expense 
reimbursement disbursement. Each period, the extent of the internal audit of expense reimbursements were 
hidden behind a MouselabWEB box. To access the audit information, participants would have to move their 
cursor over the specific box. Participants were told that if the extent of the internal audit on expense 
reimbursement was 10%, it meant that there was a 10% probability that the fraud was going to be detected 
by the auditors. As operationalized in the simulation, when perceived opportunity to commit fraud is high, 
extent of the internal audit of expense reimbursement records was 10%. On the other hand, participants were 
                                                          
2 A pilot test was conducted with 25 students to test Part Two and ensure that the case instructions were clear, the simulation 




told that when the perceived opportunity to commit fraud is low, the extent of the internal audit of expense 
reimbursement was 30%. 
Third Independent Variable- Impulsivity 
 Trait impulsivity was measured with the 30-item Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) (Patton et al. 
1995). The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) was the most widely used scale to measure trait impulsivity 
(Stanford et al. 2009, Patton et al. 1995, Barratt et al. 1975). Based on the BIS, a high score could be a result 
of relatively strong impulsive processes and/or relatively weak reflective processes (Stanford et al. 2009, 
Barratt et al. 1975). An individual with a high BIS score may have a personal challenge with keeping 
impulses under control once the impulse is activated and possess a lower level of intelligence (Shamosh et 
al. 2008). Participants completed this scale one week before participating in the simulation. 
Dependent Variable – Decision to Commit Fraud 
 For each period in the simulation, participants were presented with two choices: (1) submit an 
inflated expense reimbursement request or (2) submit the expense reimbursement request without inflating 
it. On MouselabWEB, participants had two buttons representing the choices described above. For each 
period, participants were required to decide if they wanted to submit their reimbursement request as is or 
submit an inflated reimbursement request, knowing that if the inflated reimbursement request was not 
detected by the internal auditor, they would gain financially from the decision to inflate their reimbursement 
request. Participants were not able to move on to the next period of the simulation until they chose an option 
and clicked on the “submit” button. Participants’ decision to commit fraud was recorded as a dummy 
variable in each period, with 1 indicating that they decided to inflate the reimbursement request and 0 if 
otherwise3. 
                                                          
3 FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION, a variable computed by adding up all the times a participant decided to steal then 
divided by the 10 periods in the simulation, was used as a dependent variable for sensitivity analysis. Results obtained using 
FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION is qualitatively similar to the dummy variable reported in the results section of the 




Dependent Variable – Time Taken to Make Decisions about Inflating Reimbursement 
 To test how much participants engage in any rationalization/neutralization to justify their decisions 
to engage or refrain from committing fraud, the amount of time participants spent on the pressure box, the 
opportunity box, and the time spent hovering around the two decision buttons was recorded with 
MouselabWEB. The use of MouselabWEB enabled the recording of the amount of time participants spent 
on the information provided by capturing the movement of the cursor on the screen. To access the 
information, participants had to move the mouse pointer over the boxes on the screen with labels indicating 
what information was hidden beneath. When the pointer was over a specific box, the corresponding 
information was displayed. The time taken to make decisions about inflating reimbursement was obtained 
by adding up the time spent on the pressure box, the opportunity box, and the decision buttons before 
participants elected to submit their reimbursement requests. The more time participants spent on the 
information given, the more likely participants were engaging in neutralization. Impulsive individuals, with 
the tendency to activate behavior quickly, should not have spent as much time as non-impulsive individuals 
when deciding to engage or refrain from fraud as they were not likely to engage in neutralization.  
Control Variables4 
 Participants answered questions from multiple scales to measure constructs that could affect their 
decisions in the simulation. To measure individuals’ general risk-taking tendencies, the 7-item Risk 
Propensity Scale (Meertens and Lion 2008) was used. The 1-item Berlin Numeracy test (Cokely et al. 2012) 
was used to measure risk literacy whereas the “Extreme” subscale questions from the Narcissism Spectrum 
Scale (Malkin 2015) was used to measure individuals’ narcissistic tendencies. The Berlin Numeracy test and 
part of the NSS were included as prior research find that narcissism and risk literacy affect individuals’ 
                                                          
the amount of inflation is a constant 10 Lira each period and the outcome would be similar to the 
FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION variable. 
4 These variables were measured in Part 1 of the study one week before Part Two, which contained the simulation, was presented 




decision to commit fraud. In addition, I used the Social Value Orientation Slider Scale (Murphy et al. 2011) 
to measure the magnitude of concern individuals’ have for others. Other control variables collected include 
age, gender, work experience, and prior interaction with internal auditors. For the ANCOVA analysis, 
control variables that had p-values more than 0.450 were removed. This did not change the significance of 
the ANCOVA results. 
IV. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
As reported earlier, 426 participants completed Part One of the study advertised on MTurk but only 
306 participants completed both parts of the study. The data from participants who completed the entire 
study were used to test the hypotheses presented in this paper. The simulation generated 3060 observation 
periods from the 306 participants for conducting empirical analysis.5 Of the 3060 periods played in the 
simulation, participants chose to commit fraud during 1207 periods. Fraud was detected during 310 periods, 
which was about 25% of all fraud occurrences. At a participant-level, 241 participants (78.76%) chose to 
commit fraud at least once during the simulation. Figure 2-4 shows the number of times participants chose 
to commit fraud during the simulation. Table 2-2 presents descriptive statistics on key variables, including 
those that were used to conduct statistical tests in the study. 
[Insert Table 2-2 and Figure 2-4 about here] 
The Effect of Opportunity on Individuals’ Decision to Commit Fraud 
 Theory dictates that individuals are more likely to choose to commit fraud when the opportunity to 
commit fraud is high than when the opportunity to commit fraud is low (Albrecht et al. 2008). I conducted a 
Chi-Square test (untabulated) to examine if this is true for this study and find that when the opportunity to 
commit fraud is high, individuals are more likely to commit fraud than when the opportunity to commit 
                                                          




fraud is low X 2(1, N=3060)=211.254, p<0.001. The first hypothesis predicts that when the opportunity 
presents itself, impulsive individuals will be more likely to focus on increasing their financial gain over 
other factors when making the decision to commit fraud than non-impulsive individuals. To test this 
hypothesis, I split the continuous IMPULSIVITY variable at the median to get two conditions: high 
impulsivity and low impulsivity. From the MouselabWEB simulation, it is possible to identify periods when 
participants do not mouse over the pressure box (PRESSURE_MS =0) and the opportunity box 
(OPPORTUNITY_MS =0). Without looking at the information hidden beneath the boxes, the only 
information available to the participants in each period is their bank balance. I infer that when participants 
do not take the time to look at the household expenses or the possibility of detection, they are solely 
interested in making the decision to inflate their reimbursement request or refrain from doing so based on 
the number on their bank balance. A Chi-Square test was done to test H1. The results (untabulated) suggest 
that impulsive individuals were significantly more likely to make the decision to commit fraud or refrain 
from it by looking only at their bank balance compared to non-impulsive individuals, X2(1, 
N=3060)=70.614, p<0.001, thus supporting Hypothesis 1. The disregard for factors other than bank balance 
suggest that impulsive individuals do not engage in neutralization before deciding to commit fraud or refrain 
from it.  
The Effect of Pressure on Impulsive Individuals’ Decision to Commit Fraud 
 Per theory, it is expected that individuals are more likely to commit fraud when financial pressure is 
high than when financial pressure is low (Albrecht et al. 2008). A Chi-Square test (untabulated) examining 
if this holds true for this study provides support for the theory, indicating that individuals are more likely to 
decide to inflate reimbursement requests when the financial pressure is high compared to when financial 
pressure is low, X 2(1, N=3060)=3.559, p=0.059. Hypothesis 2 posits that when pressure is high, impulsive 




pressure is low. Examining only observations when IMPULSIVITY is high6, an untabulated t-test of 
PRESSURE (high vs. low) and time taken to arrive at decision (TIME_TAKEN_TO_DECISION_MS) 
suggests that impulsive individuals take less time to make decisions about committing fraud in periods of 
high pressure than in periods of low pressure (t=1.49, p=0.068, one-tailed).  
 In Hypothesis 1, I find that impulsive individuals are more likely than non-impulsive individuals to 
focus on their bank balance when making decisions. To reduce the likelihood that the marginally significant 
result obtained from the t-test to examine Hypothesis 2 above is driven by the low amounts of 
TIME_TAKEN_TO_DECISION_MS when the participants focus only on their bank balance, I exclude 842 
observations of participants in periods where they only looked at their bank balance as a robustness check. 
Untabulated results of the t-test excluding the 842 observations yielded similar results to the earlier t-test. 
Impulsive individuals take less time to make decisions to commit fraud or refrain from it when pressure is 
high than when pressure is low (t=1.829, p=0.034, one-tailed). Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
The Effect of Pressure, Opportunity, and Impulsivity on Individuals’ Decision to Commit Fraud 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that when precursors to fraud are present, impulsive individuals will choose to 
engage or refrain from fraud behaviors in less time than non-impulsive individuals. A PRESSURE (high vs. 
low) x OPPORTUNITY (high vs. low) x IMPULSIVITY (continuous) ANCOVA was used to test Hypothesis 
3. There is a marginally significant three-way interaction between PRESSURE, OPPORTUNITY, and 
IMPULSIVITY, F(50,2837)= 1.260, p=0.052, one-tailed. Results are summarized in Table 2-3. To conduct 
simple effects tests and to graph the results, the IMPULSIVITY variable was split at the median. Analysis of 
Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6 suggests that individuals react differently when OPPORTUNITY is low compared 
to when OPPORTUNITY is high. When OPPORTUNITY is low, impulsive and non-impulsive individuals 
                                                          
6 Examining observations for non-impulsive individuals (IMPULSIVITY- low) to see if the results are different from impulsive 
individuals, I find that non-impulsive individuals react differently to impulsive individuals when pressure is high - non-impulsive 
individuals spend more time deliberating about inflating reimbursement requests when pressure is high compared to when 





are not impacted by PRESSURE and do not differ much in the amount of time taken to decide to commit 
fraud or refrain from it. A simple effects test confirms that there is no significant difference in the amount of 
time individuals take to decide to commit fraud or refrain from it when PRESSURE is high versus low 
(Impulsive individuals: p=0.331, one-tailed; Non-impulsive individuals: p=0.350, one-tailed). Figure 2-5 
also shows that when OPPORTUNITY to commit fraud is high, impulsive individuals spend less time 
reaching a decision when PRESSURE is high but they take a longer time deliberating when PRESSURE is 
low. Even though it seems the difference between time taken when PRESSURE is high and when 
PRESSURE is low is great, simple effects tests indicate that there is no significant difference in the time 
taken to arrive at a decision (p=0.126, one-tailed) for impulsive individuals. Figure 2-6 depicts the time 
taken to decision for non-impulsive individualso as longer when PRESSURE is high compared to when 
PRESSURE is low. Simple effect test for non-impulsive individuals when OPPORTUNITY is high confirms 
that the difference between time taken to arrive at a decision is significantly higher when PRESSURE is 
high than when PRESSURE is low (p=0.022, one-tailed). From the two figures, the results suggest that 
impulsive individuals take less time to make decisions about whether to submit inflated reimbursements or 
otherwise than non-impulsive individuals. As a robustness test, participants were divided into impulsive and 
non-impulsive groups using the CRT and iCRT scores. Results for simple effects tests and figures show 
similar patterns as the IMPULSIVITY variable. Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
[Insert Table 2-3, Figures 2-5, and 2-6 about here] 
Additional Analyses 
 Dividing participants into impulsive versus non-impulsive groups using the IMPULSIVITY variable, 
a Chi-Square test demonstrates that there is no significant difference in the decision to submit inflated 
reimbursement requests between the two groups X 2(1, N=3060)=2.169, p=0.141. As a robustness test, 




versus non-impulsive groups. The results support the finding from the IMPULSIVITY variable, suggesting 
there is no difference between the decision to submit inflated reimbursement requests among the two 
groups, X 2(1, N=3060)=0.138, p=0.710. These findings indicate that any differences found between 
impulsive and non-impulsive variables are not driven by one group stealing more or less than the other. 
To attempt to understand participants’ considerations during the simulation, participants answered 
six post-simulation questions that led to six different process variables. BANK_BALANCE_INFLUENCE 
measured how much participants were influenced by their bank balance when they made the decision to 
commit fraud or refrain from it. An untabulated t-test examining the BANK_BALANCE_INFLUENCE and 
IMPULSIVITY (high vs. low) suggest that impulsive individuals were more influenced by their bank balance 
when making decisions in the simulation compared to non-impulsive individuals (t=1.639, p=0.051, one-
tailed). This is consistent with H1.  
 For Hypothesis 2 the focus was centered on impulsive individuals. Besides focusing on impulsive 
individuals, I also examine the difference in reaction between impulsive and non-impulsive individuals 
when there are differences in pressure. Additional analyses were conducted to determine if there is a 
difference between TIME_TAKEN_TO_DECISION_MS and IMPULSIVITY (high vs. low) when 
PRESSURE is high and when PRESSURE is low. T-tests (untabulated) suggest that when PRESSURE is 
high, impulsive individuals spend significantly less time on decision making than non-impulsive individuals 
(t=2.459, p=0.007, one-tailed). However, when PRESSURE is low, the average time taken to make 
decisions between impulsive and non-impulsive individuals is not-significant (t=0.662, p=0.264, one-tailed). 
A test of process variables exploring the influence of pressure (PRESSURE_INFLUENCE) on their decision 
to commit fraud suggest that impulsive individuals are more influenced by PRESSURE compared to non-




Some other process variables collected at the end of the simulation were REMORSE, which recorded 
participants’ remorse over making decisions related to submitting inflated reimbursements, and 
DIFFICULT_DECISION, a variable that captured the emotional difficulty participants faced when deciding 
to inflate reimbursements. Both variables were measured on a one to seven scale, with seven being very 
difficult for DIFFICULT_DECISION and strongly agree about feeling remorse for submitting inflated 
reimbursement requests for REMORSE. An untabulated t-test of DIFFICULT_DECISION demonstrates that 
non-impulsive individuals found it significantly more difficult to submit inflated reimbursements than 
impulsive individuals (p=0.043, two-tailed). Non-impulsive individuals provided a higher rating for the 
REMORSE variable (p=0<0.01, two-tailed, untabulated), suggesting that immediately after the simulation, 
they already felt more remorseful over their decisions compared to impulsive individuals. Taken altogether, 
non-impulsive individuals seem to be neutralizing the decision during the simulation, taking a much longer 
time to arrive at a decision each period when compared to impulsive individuals. Even then, non-impulsive 
individuals were more likely to still struggle emotionally regarding their decision after the simulation than 
impulsive individuals. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Consistent with theory, individuals commit fraud at a higher rate when financial pressure is high 
and when opportunity to commit fraud without detection is high. The purpose of this study is to examine 
whether fraud triangle parts of the pressure, opportunity, and the neutralization attributes hold for impulsive 
individuals. I investigated the impact of individuals’ impulsivity on their decisions to commit fraud when 
precursors to fraud behavior is present. I find that given the opportunity, impulsive individuals are more 
likely than non-impulsive individuals to be willing to ignore other factors (e.g. internal audit detection when 
making decisions related to fraud). When pressure is high, impulsive individuals will react faster and make 




individuals react differently time-wise when opportunity to commit fraud is high, impulsive individuals still 
take less time overall when making decisions to commit fraud or to refrain from doing so. This shows that 
impulsive individuals are more likely to use the impulsive processing system without engaging the reflective 
processing system. Non-impulsive individuals, more likely to use the reflective processing system, also 
report having more difficulty when deciding to engage in fraud behavior. This suggests that they were using 
the reflective processing system to reduce any emotional discord before making the decision. As a whole, 
results show that non-impulsive individuals take more time to make fraud decisions, suggesting that they 
may engage in neutralization before deciding to commit fraud whereas impulsive individuals bypass the 
neutralization attribute of the fraud triangle when reaching the decision to commit fraud or refrain from it. 
The manipulated pressure condition in this simulation does not mirror the multitude of pressures 
individuals face in everyday life. The threat of fraud detection in the simulation was also not of the same 
magnitude as it would be if fraud was detected by internal auditors of companies. The minimal consequence 
to the participants when the fraud is detected meant that participants could have been bolder and decided to 
commit fraud at a higher rate than they probably would have in a different situation. One limitation of this 
paper is that I do not examine methods to reduce the influence of individuals’ impulsive tendencies when 
they are tempted to react to their impulses in the presence of an opportunity to commit fraud. Prior work in 
psychology find that working memory training helps to stifle the impulsive tendency and increase the 
strength of the reflective process to help individuals keep to their health goals (Houben et al. 2011). One 
method to reduce the influence of the impulsive process when it relates to unhealthy behaviors is to conduct 
attentional bias modification training, which encourages individuals to detach their focus on unhealthy 
stimuli (Fadardi and Cox 2009, Koningsbruggen et al. 2014). Another limitation of this study is the results 





These results provide new insight into the impact of pressure, opportunity, and impulsivity on 
decisions to commit fraud. More importantly, the results contribute to the white-collar crime literature and 
show that the fraud triangle does not apply to impulsive individuals as they bypass the neutralization phase 
when making decisions to commit fraud. Future research should examine if there are other situations where 
the fraud triangle might not be applicable. Further research should also be done on methods to reduce 
impulsive tendencies that are already in psychology to determine if those can be applied in the fraud 
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FIGURE 2-6  
 

































      
 
    Number           Percent 
Gender  Female  198 65% 
  Male  108 35% 
  n  306 100% 
      
Interacted with Internal Auditors Yes  115 38% 
  No  191 62% 
  n  306  100% 
       
  n Mean (S.D.)  
Age  306 36.88 (10.510)  




















 Number Percent 
Periods Played (N) 3060 100% 
Periods when Fraud Occurred 1207 39.44% 
Periods when Fraud was Detected 310 10.13% 
 
Number of Times Participants Chose to Commit Fraud During the Simulation (Out of 10 
Periods) 
Zero 65 21.24% 
One Time 11 3.59% 
Two Times 24 7.84% 
Three Times 40 13.07% 
Four Times 36 11.76% 
Five Times 42 13.73% 
Six Times 30 9.80% 
Seven Times 18 5.88% 
Eight Times 13 4.25% 
Nine Times 6 1.96% 
Ten Times 21 6.86% 
Total Number of Participants in Simulation 306 100% 
 
Variables n Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std Error 
OPPORTUNITY_MS 3060 0 69987 839.94 566.5 33.85 
PRESSURE_MS 3060 0 50388 1494.18 599.5 53.29 
INFLATION_CHOICE_MS 3060 1 56693 897.57 505.5 32.44 
TIME_TAKEN_TO_DECISION_MS 3060 1 72963 3231.7 2010.0 83.12 
BEGINNING_BALANCE_LIRA 3060 -15 140 38.03 35.0 0.36 
FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION 306 0 1 0.39 0.4 0.00 
REMORSE 306 1 7 4.84 5.0 0.03 
BANK_BALANCE_INFLUENCE 306 1 7 3.66 4.0 0.04 
PRESSURE_INFLUENCE 306 1 7 3.35 3.0 0.03 
OPPORTUNITY_INFLUENCE 306 1 7 4.53 5.0 0.04 
PERCEIVED_OPPORTUNITY 306 1 7 4.03 4.0 0.03 
DIFFICULT_DECISION 306 1 7 4.67 5.0 0.02 
IMPULSIVITY 306 31 109 57.71 57.0 0.21 
NARCISSISM 306 3 15 8.6 8.0 0.05 






ANCOVA Analysis: Effect of Pressure, Opportunity, and Impulsivity on Time Taken to Make the 
Decision to Commit Fraud 
Model: Dependent variable: TIME_TAKEN_TO_DECISION (Adjusted R2=0.124) 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
Model 222 12110000000.00 54567905.87 2.946 <0.001 
Error 2837 52550000000.00 18524014.48   
Corrected Total 3059 64670000000    
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
ID 1 256628023.00 256628023.00 13.854 <0.001 
PERIOD 1 4362936356.00 4362936356.00 235.529 <0.001 
NARCISSIM 1 25302520.72 25302520.72 1.366 0.243 
AGE 1 202666208.80 202666208.80 10.941 0.001 
GENDER 1 68009389.41 68009389.41 3.671 0.055 
INTERNAL_AUDIT_EXPERIENCE 1 160605988.70 160605988.70 8.670 0.003 
SOCIAL_VALUE_ORIENTATION 1 132071344.20 132071344.20 7.130 0.008 
CAUGHT_BY_AUDITORS 1 251388622.00 251388622.00 13.571 <0.001 
PRESSURE 1 66989009.89 66989009.89 3.616 0.057 
OPPORTUNITY 1 19672559.22 19672559.22 1.062 0.303 
IMPULSIVITY 54 2689594578.00 49807307.00 2.689 <0.001 
PRESSURE*OPPORTUNITYb 1 24247662.41 24247662.41 1.309 0.127 
IMPULSIVITY*PRESSUREb 53 1297819063.00 24487152.13 1.322 0.030 
IMPULSIVITY*OPPORTUNITYb 53 1477144357.00 27870648.25 1.505 0.005 
IMPULSIVITY*PRESSURE*OPPORTUNITYb 50 1167212308.00 23344246.17 1.260 0.052 
      
Simple effects:      
         IMPULSIVITY is High         
         Simple effect of PRESSURE  
             under OPPORTUNITY-Lowb 
1 3671836.30 3671836.30 0.191 0.331 
         Simple effect of PRESSURE  
             under OPPORTUNITY-Highb 
1 25212067.52 25212067.52 1.310 0.126 
     IMPULSIVITY is Low         
         Simple effect of PRESSURE  
             under OPPORTUNITY-Lowb 
1 2848855.30 2848855.30 0.148 0.350 
         Simple effect of PRESSURE  
             under OPPORTUNITY-Highb 
1 78684332.84 78684332.84 4.089 0.022 
      






Research Study Materials 
 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
Instructions: People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. This is a test to measure 
some of the ways in which you act and think. Read each statement and select the statement that is 
appropriate on the right side. Do not spend too much time on any statement. Answer quickly and honestly. 
1 2 3 4 
Rarely/Never Occasionally Often Almost Always/Always 
 
1. I plan tasks carefully. 
2. I do things without thinking. 
3. I make-up my mind quickly. 
4. I am happy-go-lucky. 
5. I don’t “pay attention”. 
6. I have “racing” thoughts. 
7. I plan trips well ahead of time. 
8. I am self controlled. 
9. I concentrate easily. 
10. I save regularly. 
11. I “squirm” at plays or lectures. 
12. I am a careful thinker. 
13. I plan for job security. 
14. I say things without thinking. 
15. I like to think about complex problems. 
16. I change jobs. 
17. I act “on impulse”. 
18. I get easily bored when solving thought problems. 
19. I act on the spur of the moment. 
20. I am a steady thinking. 
21. I change residences. 
22. I buy things on impulse. 
23. I can only think about one thing at a time. 
24. I change hobbies. 
25. I spend or charge more than I earn. 
26. I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking. 
27. I am more interested in the present than the future. 
28. I am restless at the theater or lectures. 
29. I like puzzles. 







Narcissism Spectrum Scale (Extreme subscale only) 
On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5(strongly agree), indicate how much you agree or disagree with each 
item. 
 
1. I secretly believe I’m better than most people. 
2. Obstacles rarely slow me down. 
3. I’m great at a lot of things compared to most people. 
 
Risk Propensity Scale 
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement by 
choosing the option you prefer (1=totally disagree, 9=totally agree). Please do not think too long before 
answering; usually your first inclination is also the best one.  
 
1. Safety first. 
2. I do not take risks with my health. 
3. I prefer to avoid risks. 
4. I take risks regularly. 
5. I really dislike not knowing what is going to happen. 
6. I usually view risks as a challenge. 
7. I view myself as a ….. (1=risk avoider, 9=risk seeker). 
 
Social Value Orientation 
Instructions: In this task you have been randomly paired with another person, whom we will refer to as the 
other. This other person is someone you do not know and will remain mutually anonymous. All of your 
choices are completely confidential. You will be making a series of decisions about allocating resources 
between you and this other person. For each of the following questions, please indicate the distribution you 
prefer most by marking the respective position along the midline. You can only make one mark for each 
question. 
 
Your decisions will yield money for both yourself and the other person. In the example below, a person has 
chosen to distribute money so that he/she receives 50 dollars, while the anonymous other person receives 40 
dollars.  
 
There are no right or wrong answers, this is all about personal preference. After you have made your 
decision, write the resulting distribution of money on the spaces on the right. As you can see, your choices 








Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
Instructions: Below are three items that vary in difficulty. Answer as many as you can.  
  
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost? _____ cents 
 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 
100 machines to make 100 widgets? _____ minutes 
 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. 
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it 
take for the patch to cover half of the lake? _____ days 
 
CRT Answer: (1) 5     (2) 5      (3) 47 





Berlin Numeracy Test (Single-item median format) 
Instructions: Please answer the question below. Do not use a calculator. 
 
1. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500 members in the 
choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in the choir 300 are men. What is the 
probability that a randomly drawn man is a member of the choir? (Please indicate the probability in 





3. Years of Work Experience 
4. During your work experience, have you interacted with internal auditors? 
 
Simulation Instructions 
WebSmart, Inc. is a marketing company that provides marketing strategies and consulting for its clients. 
 
For this simulation, please assume that you are an employee of WebSmart, and that your job requires you to 
travel to meet with clients each period. 
 
This simulation will last for multiple periods. At the beginning, you have 25 Lira in your bank balance. You 
will receive a salary of 35 Lira per period if you remain employed by WebSmart, Inc. As your job requires 
you to travel, you have expense reimbursement requests to submit to WebSmart's Accounting Department 
every period. 
 
With the expense reimbursements, you have the opportunity every time you submit a reimbursement to 
provide the Accounting Department with the right expense amount or to inflate the reimbursement by 10 
Lira. For example, if the amount you spent on travel for the period is 200 Lira, you would submit 200 Lira 
as the amount for reimbursement. If you choose to inflate the reimbursement, you would submit 210 Lira as 
the amount for reimbursement. The additional 10 Lira would then go towards paying for your household 
expenses or to your bank balance. In other words, inflating the reimbursement would increase your financial 
position. 
 
WebSmart, Inc. has internal auditors who are tasked with ensuring the company's internal controls are 
working well. Each period, the internal auditors will select a portion of the expense reimbursement requests 
to verify the expense amounts and documentation provided by the employees. In periods of high opportunity 
to inflate reimbursement, the internal auditors will verify 10% of expense reimbursement requests. This 
means that there is a 10% chance that any inflated expense reimbursement requests will be detected. In 
periods of low opportunity to inflate reimbursement, the internal auditors will verify 30% of expense 
reimbursements requests. The chance of detection in periods of low opportunity is 30%. 
 
Audit Procedures 
If you submit an inflated expense reimbursement request and the internal auditors did not detect the inflated 
request, 10 Lira will be added to increase your financial position. However, if you decide to submit an 
inflated expense reimbursement request and the internal auditors detect it, you will be penalized and have 10 





Each period will proceed as follows: 
1. You will see your bank balance, the opportunity to inflate reimbursement requests, and your household 
expenses for the period. Too see the information, move your cursor to the corresponding boxes during the 
simulation. 
 
2. Knowing that you will receive 35 Lira each period as salary, you will decide whether to inflate your 
expense reimbursement request or submit the expense reimbursement request as is. If you decide not to 
inflate your expense reimbursement request, your Bank Balance for the next period= Bank Balance for the 
current period + Salary - Household Expenses for this period. 
 
3. The internal auditors will verify the reimbursement requests at the end of the period. If you decided to 
inflate the expense reimbursement request, you will learn if the internal auditors detected the reimbursement 
inflation.  
a) If the internal auditors do not detect the inflated reimbursement request, your Bank Balance for the next 
period= Bank Balance for this period + Salary- Household Expenses +10 Lira 
b) If the internal auditors detect the inflated reimbursement request, your Bank Balance for the next period= 
Bank Balance for this period +Salary- Household Expenses -10 Lira 
 
4. You will then move on to the next period in the simulation. 
  
 At the conclusion of this simulation, you will be compensated based upon the Lira you have in the bank. 
The conversion rate is 15 Lira to $1. For example, 75 Lira are worth $5. 
 
Case Comprehension Questions 
1. What is your salary per period? 
• 10 Lira 
• 15 Lira 
• 20 Lira 
• 25 Lira 
• 30 Lira 
• 35 Lira 
2. How many Lira will you have at the beginning of the simulation? 
• 10 Lira 
• 15 Lira 
• 20 Lira 
• 25 Lira 
• 30 Lira 
• 35 Lira 
3. Your current bank balance is 10 Lira and your household expense for this period is 40 Lira. Assume 
that you decide to inflate your expense reimbursement request. How many Lira will you have on 
your bank balance if the internal auditors did not notice the inflated request? 
• 10 Lira 
• 15 Lira 
• 20 Lira 
• 25 Lira 




• 35 Lira 
4. Your current bank balance is 25 Lira and your household expense for this period is 30 Lira. Assume 
that you decide to inflate your expense reimbursement request. How many Lira will you have on 
your bank balance if the internal auditors detected that the expense reimbursement request is 
inflated? 
• 10 Lira 
• 15 Lira 
• 20 Lira 
• 25 Lira 
• 30 Lira 




Bank Balance:  _________________      Salary: 35 Lira 
 
Your household expenses and the internal auditors expense reimbursement verification extent is available 








Button A: Yes, I would like to submit an inflated expense reimbursement request. 
  
Button B: No, I would like to submit the expense reimbursement request as is. 
 
If participants chose Button A and the auditors detected the inflated reimbursement 
This period, the internal auditors selected your expense reimbursement request as part of their internal audit 
and the inflated amount was discovered. 10 Lira will be deducted from your bank balance in the next period. 
 
If participants chose Button A but the auditors did not detect the inflated reimbursement 
This period, the internal auditors did not select your expense reimbursement request as part of their internal 
audit. Consequently, the inflated amount was not discovered. 10 Lira will be added to your bank balance in 
the next period.  
 
If participants chose Button B, they moved to the next period. 
 
Post-Simulation Questions 
1. How difficult was the decision to inflate reimbursements for you? (Not difficult-Very difficult, 7-
point scale) 
2. I feel bad about submitting inflated reimbursement requests during the simulation. (Strongly 
disagree- Strongly agree, 7-point scale) 
Household Expenses for 
this Period 
% of Expense Reimbursement 





3. The perceived opportunity to inflate expense reimbursement requests without detection in the 
simulation is (Very low-Very high, 7-point scale) 
4. How much did the household expense listed influence your decision to inflate or not to inflate the 
expense reimbursement request? (Minimum influence-Maximum influence, 7-point scale) 
5. How much did the percentage of expense reimbursement request selected for internal audit listed 
influence your decision to inflate or not to inflate the expense reimbursement request? (Minimum 
influence-Maximum influence, 7-point scale) 
6. How much did your displayed bank balance influence your decision to inflate or not to inflate the 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Auditors frequently interact with client personnel to gather information during an audit. 
Given human resource turnover in both auditing and at audit clients, auditors often meet with client 
personnel for the first time and form first impressions. Prior research suggests that first impressions strongly 
influence individuals’ assessments of evidence (Porter, Gustaw & ten Brinke 2010). The purpose of this 
paper is to examine how first impressions of client personnel affect auditor risk judgments and whether 
auditor mindset attenuates the effects of first impressions on auditors’ risk judgments. 
Risk judgments are an important part of the audit process because they directly impact audit quality. 
Recent auditing standards have emphasized the importance of risk assessment in auditing (IAASB 2006a, 
2006b, 2006c; PCAOB 2007; AICPA 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). Auditors assess misstatement risks during the 
planning phase of an audit and use their risk assessments to plan the evidence to collect to test the validity of 
management’s assertions. Additionally, auditors make regular risk judgments throughout the audit to 
determine the likelihood or risk that the client’s financial statements are materially misstated. Because of 
this risk-based approach to auditing, erroneous conclusions could result if first impressions lead to 
inappropriate risk judgments (Fukukawa & Mock 2011).  
Objectivity is central to making appropriate risk judgments because it requires auditors to be 
“impartial” and “intellectually honest” and should reduce cognitive biases (AICPA 2014, 6). Consequently, 
interventions or policies that help auditors maintain objectivity should help them better assess risk and may 
help them overcome first-impression biases. Regarding overcoming first-impression biases, prior research in 
psychology suggests that, because first impressions are subconscious, interventions may not help auditors 
overcome their effects on judgment. Auditors in the field (e.g., seniors and associates) have been shown to 
be influenced by the mindset preferred by their superiors (e.g., managers and partners) (Griffith et al. 2015). 




auditors become more…We explore the impact of auditor mindset on first impressions to determine how 
this potential intervention interacts with auditors’ first impressions to influence their risk judgments. 
Prior research on first impressions differ on the type of individuals selected as participants. Some use 
students (Dunning et al. 1990; Peters and Gawronski 2011; Rule, Tskhay, Freeman & Ambady 2014) 
whereas others recruit professionals (Porter & ten Brinke 2009; Evans, Kleine, Landry & Crosby 2000; 
Nordholm 1980). A psychology study found that students are overconfident when making judgments of 
others based only on first impressions, even when the judgments were wrong half the time (Dunning et al. 
1990). A different psychology study with participants recruited online found that appearances are weighted 
more heavily over other information provided when predicting individual characteristics and this can have 
serious effects on accuracy (Olivola & Todorov 2010). When jurors form positive first impressions of the 
defendant, more evidence is required to convict the defendant as guilty and the sentence is more lenient 
compared to when jurors form negative first impressions of the defendant (Porter & ten Brinke 2009). Smith 
and Kida (1991) suggest that to effectively examine heuristic judgements of auditors, having auditors, 
instead of students, as participants working on an audit task is more appropriate since they are less 
susceptible to the same types of cognitive biases found in studies using student participants.  
This study explores whether auditor mindset influences the effects of first impressions on judgments 
of risk the valuation of inventory. We hypothesize that in the efficiency mindset, auditors’ valuations of 
inventory are more favorable to the client when the first impression of the client is positive than when the 
first impression is negative. In addition, we predict that auditors in the efficiency mindset will be more 
affected by first impression biases when compared to auditors in the effectiveness mindset. 
We designed a 2x2 experiment to test our hypotheses. We used pre-recorded videos to simulate a 
client inquiry in which auditors were asked to discuss inventory valuation with a member of client 
personnel. After watching the videos, auditors were asked to provide a risk judgment and estimate the value 




participated in our experiment. We manipulated first impressions by using either a positive or negative first 
impression video at the beginning of the inquiry. We manipulated mindset by encouraging auditors to either 
be effective or efficient. We hypothesize and find that auditors in the efficiency mindset are more likely to 
be swayed by their first impressions of the client when making audit judgments than auditors in the 
effectiveness mindset. We show that when auditors are in the effectiveness mindset, first impression biases 
are attenuated such that they place greater emphasis on the evidence provided when compared to auditors in 
the efficiency mindset. Specifically, when auditors are in the effectiveness mindset, the assessment of 
inventory is similar regardless of their first impression of the client, suggesting that the focus is on the 
evidence.  
This paper makes several contributions to research in psychology and auditing. First, we extend the 
research on first impressions by examining auditors’ interaction with client personnel. This unique setting is 
different than those from prior psychology research on first impressions because professional auditing 
standards dictate that auditors remain objective throughout the audit (AICPA 2014). Second, from a 
practical perspective, our results suggest ways that audit firms can potentially improve audit quality by 
helping auditors overcome the natural tendency to be biased by first impressions. Specifically, our results 
suggest that when auditors are encouraged to think critically about evidence, subconscious first impression 
biases are attenuated.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides a background review of the 
relevant literature and the development of hypotheses. Section III is a general outline of the research 
method and our experimental design. Section IV provides results of the experiment and Section V 






II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
First Impressions 
First impressions are formed when individuals interact within a social setting. Psychology research 
on first impressions shows that individuals categorize those they meet based on their traits such as 
confidence, persistence, stubbornness, and conceitedness (Moskowitz & Roman 1992). For example, 
Moskowitz & Roman (1992) state that “categorizing the actions of others in trait terms is both a common 
and an important aspect of person perception and social judgment.” Prior studies have shown that 
individuals spontaneously categorize the behavior of others and that such categorization is not a behavior 
that can be controlled or inhibited (Newman & Uleman 1990; Winter & Uleman 1984; Winter, Uleman, & 
Cunniff 1985). Moreover, this categorization occurs almost instantaneously – individuals can form first 
impressions within 100 milliseconds of meeting other individuals (Willis & Todorov 2006). Research on 
first impressions identifies several important implications. For example, first impressions guide how one 
interacts with others, what information is stored, and how one will predict the behaviors of others (Feldman 
1981; Fiske & Neuberg 1990; Gingerich, Regehr, & Eva 2011; Wood 2014).  
Most research on first impressions involves participants looking at a picture or watching a short 
video clip of an individual and then making judgments about various characteristics of the individual 
including such things as sexual orientation, drug use, education level, gun ownership, relationship status, 
aggressive tendencies, political leanings, and others. Accuracy of first impressions based solely on 
appearance is around 55% (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross 1990; Tversky & Kahneman 1974; 
Olivola & Todorov 2010). In addition, people are generally overconfident in their ability to predict the traits 
of others based on appearances and rely heavily on appearance even in the presence of other cues.  
First impressions can bias subsequent information processing in two ways. First, they can serve as an 
anchor, and may cause people to discount subsequent, more relevant information received after a first 




judgments, Porter and ten Brinke (2009) find that “first impressions of trustworthiness based on facial 
appearance may play a major role in the assessment of credibility and ensuing decisions about the target.” 
Specifically, jurors who formed positive first impressions of a defendant required more evidence to convict 
the defendant as guilty and recommended a more lenient sentence, relative to jurors who formed negative 
first impressions of a defendant. Their results suggest jurors may anchor on first impressions and discount 
subsequent, more-relevant evidence, even though jurors are meant to base their decisions solely on 
evidence. When prior impressions are discovered to be false, the first impressions are not easy to reverse 
even with the addition of new information (Rule, Tskhay, Freeman & Ambady 2014; Peters & Gawronski 
2011). 
Second, first impressions may lead to the creation of stereotypes, which are then reinforced by 
confirmation bias during subsequent interaction (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid 1977). This idea is consistent 
with individuals’ tendency to seek confirming evidence (McMillan & White 1993; Nickerson 1998). Thus, 
when subjects form a negative first impression of an individual, they seek evidence that confirms their 
negative first impression. In contrast, when subjects form a positive first impression of an individual, they 
are likely to seek evidence that confirms their positive first impression and discount or ignore evidence to 
the contrary (Snyder et al. 1977).  
In order to gather evidence during an audit, auditors frequently meet with client personnel. 
Consistent with extant literature, we expect auditors to be subject to the biases inherent in the formation of 
first impressions. However, the extent to which first impressions bias auditors’ subsequent judgments is 
likely contingent on auditor mindset, as discussed next. 
Auditor Mindset 
Mindset is “an attitude or the manner with which a person approaches a situation” (Collins English 
Dictionary 2018). Gollwitzer (1990) defined it as a set of judgmental criteria and cognitive processes when 




focus in on certain elements to quickly make decisions. In the area of psychology, Action Phase Theory 
states that individuals in a deliberative mindset are in the process of deciding what, if any, action to take, 
while individuals in an implemental mindset are in the process of planning an action they have already 
decided to take (Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope 2004; Gollwitzer 1990). Research has associated the 
deliberative mindset with a higher degree of objectivity, further psychological distance from the decision, 
increased memory retention, increased ability to process information, and higher openness toward incidental 
stimuli (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer 1987; Gollwitzer 1990; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Stellar 1990; 
Gollwitzer & Bayer 1999; Fujita, Gollwitzer, & Oettinger 2007; Buttner, Wieber, Schulz, Bayer, Gloreck, & 
Gollwitzer 2014). Individuals in the deliberative mindset are more objective and more willing to attend to 
risk factors, whereas individuals in the implemental mindset are less objective and less willing to attend to 
risk factors due to their focus on getting the task done and their reluctance to be sidetracked (Taylor & 
Gollwitzer 1995; Buttner et al 2014). When individuals are in an implemental mindset, they demonstrate 
significantly lower objectivity and breadth of attention, as well as increased optimism – all of which 
increase the probability of potentially risky outcomes (Rasso 2015; Buttner et al. 2014; Puca 2004; Taylor & 
Gollwitzer 1995).  
During an audit, auditors are faced with two competing demands – effectiveness and efficiency. 
Effectiveness refers to the quality of the auditor’s conduct of the engagement and decisions about detected 
errors, whereas efficiency refers to the timeliness and cost of performing the audit (Knechel & Sharma 
2012). We posit that auditors who are in the effectiveness mindset, are in a mindset that is similar to the 
deliberative mindset from the Action Phases Theory. In an auditing context, auditors may adopt an 
effectiveness mindset when they focus an audit plan on providing sufficient evidence to test management’s 
assertions in their financial statements. They actively consider steps to take to ensure that sufficient 




higher degree of objectivity and the ability to incorporate more information when processing evidence 
relative to auditors who are in an efficiency mindset.  
The efficiency mindset is similar to the implemental mindset from the Action Phases Theory. 
Auditors with an efficiency mindset have a “check-the-box” mentality, and work to complete each task as 
quickly as possible. Auditors may adopt an efficiency mindset as they carry out each step in the audit plan. 
In this study about audit judgement we use efficiency and effectiveness, widely-recognized audit concepts, 
as the two contrasting mindsets. 
Once a mindset is activated, the mindset has the potential to influence information processing in 
subsequent tasks even though the tasks may be unrelated (Griffith, Hammersley, Kadous, & Young 2015; 
Buttner et al. 2014; Fujita, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen 2007). With step-by-step audit programs that firms use 
to maintain audit consistency (Griffith, Hammersley, & Kadous 2014), auditors tend to approach the audit 
with an efficiency mindset. A study conducted by Griffith et al. (2015) demonstrated that being in an 
effectiveness mindset enhances auditors’ ability to include contradictory information from multiple sources 
and provide better accounting estimates. A relevant characteristic of the audit setting is the significant time 
pressure under which auditors operate, particularly during busy season (Smith 2000). Auditors are generally 
uncompensated for the time it takes to gather additional audit evidence and the time necessary to gather 
additional evidence may cause the audit to go over budget, which can lead to negative performance reviews 
for auditors. Budget concerns and pressure from audit clients constantly put auditors under time constraints 
(Arnold 1997; Cook & Kelley 1988; Waggoner & Cashell 1991).  
We posit that in many cases, the time pressures inherent in auditing cause concerns for efficiency to 
influence auditors to a greater degree than concerns for effectiveness. The likelihood of efficiency concerns 
prevailing over effectiveness concerns is exacerbated because, on most audits, there is a low likelihood of 
material misstatement. Thus, auditors’ concern for efficiency may prompt them to adopt an efficiency 




plan how to gather sufficient audit evidence and critically incorporate all the information on hand. Once in 
the efficiency mindset, auditors are less likely to objectively consider audit evidence, focusing instead on 
performing audit tasks quickly. In addition, auditors in an efficiency mindset may be less sensitive to factors 
suggesting higher risk.  
This expectation is consistent with prior auditing research. For example, Coram et al. (2004) find 
that in the presence of high time pressure, auditors accept doubtful audit evidence regardless of the risk of 
misstatement. In addition, auditors under high time pressure failed to test all items in a selected sample 
when the perceived audit risk was low (Coram, Ng, & Woodliff 2004). Braun (2000) finds that auditors take 
less time to complete audit procedures as time pressure increases and results in less attention to audit 
evidence and the qualitative aspect of misstatements; Braun’s (2000) study and subsequent research shows 
that time pressure led auditors to be efficient at completing tasks but not effective in detecting potential 
fraudulent financial reporting (Braun 2000, Hogan et al. 2008, Janvrin & Jeffrey 2007). The results of these 
studies suggest that time pressure may lead auditors to adopt an efficiency mindset, which reduces 
objectivity and sensitivity to risk. As the formation of first impressions is a subconscious process, we 
believe that auditors who are in the efficiency mindset will find it hard to ignore first impression influences 
and place more emphasis on the first impression of the client instead of the evidence provided during the 
audit. Specifically, we expect first impressions to be negatively correlated with risk judgments and 
positively correlated with inventory valuation when auditors are in the efficiency mindset. Stated formally: 
H1A:  Auditors in an efficiency mindset who form positive first impressions 
of the client will provide a higher dollar amount when valuing 
inventory than auditors who form negative first impressions. 
 
H1B:  Auditors in an efficiency mindset who form positive first impressions 
of the client will provide lower risk judgments when assessing the risk 






We expect auditors in the efficiency mindset to be primarily concerned with completing the audit in 
a timely manner. Because of this focus on efficiency, they will be more susceptible to first impression biases 
in comparison with auditors who are in an effectiveness mindset. One potential intervention for reducing the 
effects of first impressions during the audit is to encourage auditors to focus on the evidence, as discussed 
next. 
The Effect of Auditor Mindset and First Impression Valence on Risk Factor Detection 
Auditor mindset should affect the way first impressions influence the analysis of subsequent audit 
evidence in two ways – through sensitivity to risk factors and susceptibility to confirmation bias. First, 
mindset can influence sensitivity to risk factors. Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) find that individuals focused 
on deliberation have “significantly poorer mood, significantly lower self-esteem, and significantly lower 
perceived invulnerability to risk” than individuals with an implemental mindset who are focused on 
completing tasks quickly. Extending this to auditing, when auditors are deliberating and incorporating 
available evidence, being in an effectiveness mindset could be the time when they think more about the 
objectives of the audit. Based on the discussion thus far, we expect auditors in the effectiveness mindset to 
be more sensitive to risk factors than auditors in an efficiency mindset, regardless of first impression 
valence (i.e., positive vs negative). The increased sensitivity to risk factors for auditors in the effectiveness 
mindset suggests that first impressions will carry less relative influence on their risk judgments when 
compared with auditors in the efficiency mindset, and relatively more weight on subsequent audit evidence. 
In other words, auditors in an effectiveness mindset will be sufficiently focused on audit evidence that the 
relative importance of first impressions will be diminished when compared with auditors in an efficiency 
mindset.  
In contrast, auditors who are in an efficiency mindset are less likely to adequately consider risk 
factors that are portrayed by clients during an inquiry, primarily because goal implementation may blind 




efficiently may prevent them from fully incorporating risk factors into their risk judgments. In a recent 
study, Rasso (2015) finds that auditors in an efficiency mindset demand less evidence before making 
subsequent audit judgments than auditors in an effectiveness mindset, which suggests that auditors in an 
efficiency mindset place less value on audit evidence. Even though auditors in an efficiency mindset may 
fail to pay attention to risk factors that arise during client inquiry, the formation of first impressions is 
subconscious and should have some bearing on subsequent auditor judgments. Thus, auditors in an 
efficiency mindset will place greater relative weight on their first impression of the client compared to 
auditors in an effectiveness mindset, and their first impression of the client will be a more significant factor 
when assessing in their risk judgments relative to auditors in an effectiveness mindset. This conjecture is 
consistent with the work of Porter and ten Brinke (2009), which suggests that first impression biases may 
lead to irrational decisions even when other evidence is available because individuals are generally highly 
influenced by first impressions.  
As discussed previously, first impressions may also lead to confirmation bias (Snyder et al. 1977), 
which can cause auditors to seek evidence that supports their first impression. The degree to which auditors 
are subject to confirmation bias is likely contingent on auditor mindset. Individuals who employ motivated 
reasoning search for rules and creatively combine evidence and information to construct new beliefs and 
maintain an “illusion of objectivity” to logically support a desired conclusion (Pyszcynski & Greenberg 
1987; Kruglanski 1980). While all auditors may have incentives to engage in motivated reasoning, we 
expect auditors in an efficiency mindset to be more likely to engage in motivated reasoning than auditors in 
an effectiveness mindset. This is because auditors in an efficiency mindset are focused on getting the work 
completed as quickly as possible. Discovering  accounting anomalies results in additional work, causing 
auditors to go over budget.  
Auditors who are concerned with audit effectiveness are likely to consider whether there is sufficient 




They are therefore more likely to objectively consider audit evidence, rather than engage in confirmation 
bias to support their first impressions. Thus, auditors in an effectiveness mindset are less likely to engage in 
confirmation bias than auditors in an efficiency mindset, regardless of first impression valence. In contrast, 
auditors in an efficiency mindset are focused on quickly completing the audit and are less likely to 
objectively consider subsequent audit evidence. Therefore, auditors in an efficiency mindset are more likely 
than auditors in an effectiveness mindset to engage in confirmation bias to support their first impressions. 
As a result, first impression valence should have a greater effect on auditors in an efficiency mindset than 
auditors in an effectiveness mindset, which motivates our second hypothesis: 
H2A:  The difference in the valuation of inventory between positive and negative 
first impression conditions will be less for auditors in the effectiveness 
mindset than for those in the efficiency mindset.  
 
H2B:  The difference in the risk of material misstatement of inventory between 
positive and negative first impression conditions will be less for auditors in 
the effectiveness mindset than for auditors in the efficiency mindset.  
 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHODS 
Participants 
We recruited 181 auditors via email and LinkedIn from Big Four, regional, and local firms to take 
part in the experiment. Forty-one observations were excluded because auditors did not watch the 
experimental videos in their entirety. Another 16 observations were excluded from the analysis because the 
participants failed the manipulation check question. We tested the hypotheses using the remaining 124 
observations. Approximately 75% of our participants are staff or senior auditors. The mean age of our 
participants is 30 years and the average years of work experience is five years. Table 1 presents the 
participant demographics of the 124 auditor participants.  






Case materials were adapted from Nöteberg and Hunton (2005). Data were collected electronically 
via the Qualtrics survey platform. Participants received the link to this study in a recruitment email or via 
LinkedIn. After consenting to participate in this study, participants read the case background. Participants 
were instructed to assume that they were part of the audit team assigned to MicroClone, Inc., a company 
selling computers, and that this was his/her first year working on this assignment. Their supervisor had 
requested that they gain a better understanding of the appropriate inventory valuation for the company as the 
company had recently introduced the 5th generation computers, and it was therefore possible that the value 
of the older 4th generation computers was impaired.  
After reading the case background, participants watched a series of videos to simulate a client 
inquiry in which inventory valuation is discussed with MicroClone’s controller.7 The first video simulated 
the introduction to the client, which formed the basis for the participant’s first impression. After the 
introductory video, the participant was asked to click a button in order to ask the controller an additional 
question. The controller responded in the following video. Each participant viewed nine information video 
clips in addition to the introductory clip. At the end of the client inquiry with the controller, participants 
were asked to provide an estimated value for the 4th generation computers’ inventory and to assess the risk 
that the 4th generation computers were materially misstated. In addition, participants were asked to provide 
an explanation behind their assessment of the valuation. Finally, participants answered post-experiment 
questions, including the Impression Formation Questionnaire (Snyder et al. 1977) in which they reported 
their impressions of the controller, as well as demographic questions.  
 
 
                                                          




First Impression Manipulation 
All participants saw an introductory video that lasted approximately 10 seconds. We manipulated 
first impression so that half of the participants saw a positive impression video and the other half of the 
participants saw a negative first impression video. In the positive first impression video, the controller spoke 
clearly, smiled, and was welcoming when the participant asked for time to talk about the inventory. In the 
negative first impression video, the controller looked annoyed by the request and grumbled that the auditors 
always stopped by at the worst times.8 All other videos in the client inquiry simulation were the same across 
conditions. 
Mindset Manipulation 
Mindset was also manipulated between participants. The effectiveness and efficiency mindsets of 
the participants were manipulated at the beginning of the experiment. In the efficiency mindset condition, 
the audit supervisor’s states: “My main concern is that we work efficiently on this audit so that we don’t 
exceed our time budget. I need you to speak to the controller so we can efficiently complete our inventory 
valuation tests without incurring excess audit costs in this area.” In the effectiveness mindset condition, 
the audit supervisor states: “My main concern is that we effectively perform the inventory testing, and I’m 
not concerned with how many hours we spend. I need you to speak to the controller so we can effectively 
perform our inventory valuation tests and reach the appropriate conclusion in this area.” 
First Dependent Variable - Inventory Valuation 
The first dependent variable in this study is the inventory valuation of 4th generation computers 
participants provide after evaluating the responses given by the controller and the case information. 
Participants were told that the finished goods inventory of the company include 2,000 units of 4th generation 
                                                          
8 To select the positive and negative impression videos, we conducted a pilot study in which we recorded several first impression 
videos and had 26 participants rate the controller in each video using the nine questions from the Impression Formation 
Questionnaire. We then selected the videos that were rated as most positive and most negative in the pilot study to be used in the 




computers and 6,000 units of 5th generation computers. Furthermore, they were told that there was a concern 
about the value of the 4th generation computers because with the 5th generation computers now on the 
market, the 4th generation computers would become obsolete. There was some evidence that the 4th 
generation computers should have been valued at $800 per unit instead of the current value of $1,000 per 
unit. After meeting with the controller of the company to discuss the inventory issue, auditors were to 
determine if the current valuation of $1,000 per unit for the 4th generation computers is appropriate. 
Participants were asked to provide a total value of the 4th generation computers between $1,600,000 and 
$2,000,000. 
Second Dependent Variable - Risk of Material Misstatement 
The second dependent variable in this study was the risk of material misstatement of the value of the 
4th generation computers in the inventory account. Participants were asked to rate the risk of material 
misstatement on scale of one to nine, with one being extremely low risk and nine being extremely high risk. 
Participant’s response to this risk of material misstatement question should be related to their inventory 
valuation amount. If they value the inventory of the 4th generation computers to be high, the risk of material 
misstatement should be low. Conversely, if participants value the inventory of the 4th generation computers 
to be much lower than the current valuation, the risk of material misstatement should be high. 
Control Variables 
We collected and controlled for information related to participants’ age, gender, years of work 
experience in the audit field, firm type, and rank in this study. 
IV. RESULTS 
The Effect of First Impression on Risk Factor Detection 
Table 3-2 presents the descriptive statistics by experimental condition for the two dependent 




computers inventory account. Results from t-tests comparing these means (untabulated) indicate that when 
auditors are in the efficiency mindset, a positive first impression results in higher inventory valuations (t = 
1.528 p=0.066, one-tailed) and lower assessed risk of material misstatement (t = 1.867, p = 0.034, one-
tailed). In contrast, when auditors are in the effectiveness mindset, the difference in means are not 
significant for either the inventory valuation variable (t = 0.193, p = 0.424, one-tailed) or the risk of material 
misstatement variable (t = 0.873, p = 0.193, one-tailed). These results provide preliminary evidence 
consistent with our hypotheses that auditors in the effectiveness mindset are less influenced by first 
impressions than auditors in the efficiency mindset. 
[Insert Table 3-2 about here] 
 
While the main analyses of our paper are based on our manipulated conditions, first impressions can 
vary substantially between subjects. Accordingly, we created another impression variable based on 
participants’ responses to the Impression Formation Questionnaire (Snyder et al. 1977), which is a 9-item 
scaled used to measure impressions. Analyses using this variable, FIRST IMPRESSION IFQ, is intended as 
a robustness check. Descriptive statistics for the two dependent variables using the perceived first 
impression variable and the mindset variable are available in Table 3.9 Results from the t-tests using the 
perceived rather than manipulated variables are generally stronger, and indicate that when auditors are in the 
efficiency mindset, positive first impressions lead to significantly higher inventory valuations (t = 2.541 p = 
0.007, one-tailed) and lower assessments of the risk of material misstatement (t = 1.726, p = 0.045, one-
tailed). When auditors are in the effectiveness mindset, the differences in means of the inventory valuation 
variable (t = 0.315, p = 0.377, one-tailed) and the risk of material misstatement variable (t=0.581, p=0.282, 
one tailed) are not significant. This further supports our hypotheses that auditors in the effectiveness mindset 
are less influenced by first impressions compared to auditors in the efficiency mindset. 
 [Insert Table 3-3 about here] 
                                                          





To formally test our hypotheses, we use ANOVA to analyze our data. For the analysis presented 
here, control variables with a p-value of less than 1.2 in the fully-ascribed model are excluded. Hypothesis 1 
predicts that auditors in the efficiency mindset who form positive first impressions will (a) provide a higher 
inventory valuation and (b) provide lower risk judgments when assessing risk of material misstatement of 
the inventory account than auditors who form negative first impressions of the client. Hypothesis 2 predicts 
that the difference in (a) inventory valuation and (b) risk of material misstatement of inventory for the 4th 
generation computers between positive and negative first impression conditions will be less for auditors in 
the effectiveness mindset than for auditors in the efficiency mindset. A first impression (positive vs. 
negative) x mindset (effectiveness vs. efficiency) ANOVA was used to test differences between means for 
significance. Results are summarized in Table 5.10 We test H1 by examining the simple effects for the 
efficiency condition in Panels A and B. The results support H1 in that they indicate that within the 
efficiency mindset condition, auditors who had a positive first impression of the controller assessed higher 
inventory values (p = 0.060, one-tailed) and lower risk of material misstatement (p = 0.026, one-tailed) than 
auditors who had a negative first impression.  
We test H2 by examining how the effect of first impression changes when auditors are in the 
effectiveness mindset condition. While the interaction of First Impression x Mindset is not statistically 
significant in panels A and B, we note that the simple effects for First Impression are insignificant in the 
effectiveness mindset condition for both inventory valuation (p = 0.424, one-tailed) and risk of material 
misstatement (p = 0.206, one-tailed). Additional analysis (untabulated) from process variables at the end of 
the experiment indicate that auditors in the effectiveness condition are more likely to be influenced by the 
evidence presented (r= 0.188, p = 0.038) when compared to auditors in the efficiency condition. Analysis of 
                                                          
10 We collected data on age, gender, work experience, firm type, and firm role as control variables. Analysis of the fully-ascribed 




Figures 1 and 2 also suggest a greater effect of first impression in the efficiency mindset condition 
compared to the effectiveness mindset condition. Thus, we find partial support for H2.  
 [Insert Table 3-5, Figure 3-1, and Figure 3-2 about here] 
 
We perform additional ANOVA analyses using the continuous, measured perceptions of 
impressions, First Impression IFQ, as a robustness check. Results using the two conditions derived from the 
perceived first impression score are presented in Table 65 and are generally consistent with our main 
analyses. We find that in the efficiency mindset condition, positive first impressions resulted in significantly 
higher inventory valuations (p = 0.006, one-tailed) and marginally significantly lower risk of material 
misstatement (p = 0.036, one-tailed) when compared to negative first impressions. We find no significant 
difference for our independent variables in the effectiveness mindset condition. Furthermore, we find a 
statistically significant interaction between First Impression and Mindset for inventory valuations. These 
results provide additional support for our hypotheses.  
 [Insert Table 3-6 about here] 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This study examines the impact of first impressions and auditor mindset on auditors’ risk 
assessments. Auditors subconsciously form first impressions of client personnel as they meet with client 
personnel to gather audit information. Auditors’ first impression of the client can bias auditor opinion of the 
evidence presented during the audit. Time pressure is inherent in auditing, and this might result in the 
prevalence of the efficiency mindset as auditors are working through audit tasks. Results of this study 
suggest that auditors in the efficiency mindset are biased by their first impression of clients and this affects 
the way they view subsequent evidence. When auditors’ first impression of client personnel is positive, they 
view evidence less objectively and judge risk to be lower than if they have a negative first impression of the 




personnel is positive compared to when the first impression is negative. Audit firms need to find ways to 
alleviate this first impression bias. Although prior research in psychology assumes that first impressions are 
subconscious and, therefore, unavoidable, we show that encouraging auditors to be in an effectiveness 
mindset can mitigate first impression biases and enable auditors to remain objective when interacting with 
new client personnel. 
 We acknowledge that our study lacks external validity due to our inability to capture key aspects of 
the field in an experiment. For example, the pressure and incentives to complete the audit are likely much 
more salient in the real world than they were for our auditors. However, in the short, 10-second, window of 
the manipulated first impression videos the results show a significant difference in auditors’ risk judgments 
and inventory valuation decisions. Another limitation of our study is the lack of a source other than the 
controller to verify information or to seek additional confirmatory evidence. An auditor’s possible response 
in the field when not convinced with information provided by the controller would be to seek other sources 
of evidence; however, doing so would significantly increase audit time pressure.  
 These results provide insights into the impact of first impressions on audit judgments. We show that 
auditors’ first impressions of client personnel can bias their risk judgments and valuation decisions and 
thereby have the potential to impair audit quality. Time pressures that auditors face and the “check the box” 
mentality puts auditors in the efficiency mindset where the focus is to get things done and move to the next 
task. Future research can examine how other personality traits such as self-esteem, extroversion-
introversion, and professional skepticism interact with first impression biases to influence risk assessments 
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  Table 3-1   
Participant Demographics 
   
Number Percent 
Gender Female  22 17.70% 
 Male  102 82.30% 
 n  124 100.00% 
Type of Accounting Firm 
 Big Four  80 64.52% 
 Regional  19 15.32% 
 Local  16 12.90% 
 Other  9 7.26% 
 n  124 100.00% 
Role in Accounting Firm 
 Staff Auditor 58 46.77% 
 Senior Auditor 36 29.03% 
 Audit Manager 22 17.74% 
 Partner  6 4.84% 
 Other  2 1.61% 
 n  124 100.00% 
 
n Mean (S.D.) 
 
Age 124 30.02 (7.63)  
Years of Work 
Experience 














 TABLE 3-2   
Descriptive Statistics of Auditor Participants' Inventory Valuation and Risk of 
Material Misstatement 
Panel A: Cell Means (SD) [n] for Inventory Valuation 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS*MINDSET Efficiency Effectiveness Overall 
Positive $1,933,333.33 $1,910,714.29 $1,922,950.82 
 ($136,167.79) ($152,362.35) ($143,054.12) 
 [33] [28] [61] 
Negative $1,871,666.67 $1,903,030.30 $1,888,095.24 
 ($178,925.59) ($157,092.43) ($167,214.92) 
 [30] [33] [63] 
Overall $1,903,968.25 $1,906,557.38 $1,905,241.94 
 ($159,712.84) ($153,697.60) ($156,150.15) 
 [63] [61] [124] 
Panel B: Cell Means (SD) [n] for Risk of Material Misstatement 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS*MINDSET Efficiency Effectiveness Overall 
Positive 4.88 4.89 4.89 
 (1.87) (1.77) (1.81) 
 [33] [28] [61] 
Negative 5.77 5.27 5.51 
 (1.91) (1.63) (1.77) 
 [30] [33] [63] 
Overall 5.30 5.10 5.20 
 (1.92) (1.69) (1.81) 










 TABLE 3-3   
Auditor Participants' Inventory Valuation and Risk of Material Misstatement 









Positive $1,951,515.15 $1,912,500.00 $1,932,307.69 
 ($120,211.30) ($145,358.29) ($133,589.50) 
 [33] [32] [65] 
Negative $1,851,666.67 $1,900,000.00 $1,875,423.73 
 ($182,172.40) ($164,750.89) ($174,042.43) 
 [30] [29] [59] 
Overall $1,903,968.25 $1,906,557.38 $1,905,241.94 
 ($159,712.84) ($153,697.60) ($156,150.15) 
 [63] [61] [124] 









Positive 4.91 5.22 5.06 
 (1.79) (1.68) (1.73) 
 [33] [32] [65] 
Negative 5.73 4.97 5.36 
 (1.99) (1.72) (1.89) 
 [30] [29] [59] 
Overall 5.30 5.10 5.20 
 (1.92) (1.69) (1.81) 









  Table 3-4    
ANOVA Analysis: Effect of First Impression on Auditors' Judgment of Inventory 
Valuation and the Risk of Material Misstatement under the Efficiency Mindset 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Inventory Valuation (Adjusted R2=0.142) 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
Model 6 356600000000 59430000000 2.717 0.022 
Error 56 1225000000000 21870000000   
Corrected Total 62 1582000000000    
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
Age 1 53720000000 53720000000 2.456 0.123 
Gender 1 3215912879 3215912879 0.147 0.703 
Years of Work Experience 1 176300000000 176300000000 8.060 0.006 
Type of Accounting Firm 1 5581993479 5581993479 0.255 0.615 
Role in Accounting Firm 1 37650000000 37650000000 1.721 0.195 
First Impression 1 64790000000 64790000000 2.962 0.091 
Panel B: Dependent variable: Risk of Material Misstatement (Adjusted R2=0.075) 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
Model 6 37.795 6.299 1.842 0.107 
Error 56 191.474 3.419   
Corrected Total 62 229.270    
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
Age 1 0.851 0.851 0.249 0.620 
Gender 1 1.439 1.439 0.421 0.519 
Years of Work Experience 1 0.194 0.194 0.057 0.813 
Type of Accounting Firm 1 4.266 4.266 1.248 0.269 
Role in Accounting Firm 1 1.474 1.474 0.431 0.514 












ANOVA Analysis: Effect of First Impression and Mindset on Auditors’ Judgment of Inventory 
Valuation and the Risk of Material Misstatement 
      
Panel A: Dependent variable: Inventory Valuation (Adjusted R2=0.004) 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
Model 3 6.08601E+10 20286685980 0.829 0.481 
Error 120 2.93823E+12 24485272370   
Corrected Total 123 2.99909E+12    
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
First Impression 1 37095071870 37095071870 1.515 0.221 
Mindset 1 589785284 589785284 0.024 0.877 
First Impression*Mindsetb 1 22476262750 22476262750 0.918 0.170 
      
Simple effects:      
     Simple effect of First Impression      
          under Mindset-Efficiencyb 1 59757936510 59757936510 2.441 0.060 
     Simple effect of First Impression      
          under Mindset-Effectivenessb 1 894365197 894365197 0.037 0.424 
      
Panel B: Dependent variable: Risk of Material Misstatement (Adjusted R2=0.015) 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
Model 3 15.854 5.285 1.642 0.183 
Error 120 386.106 3.218   
Corrected Total 123 401.960    
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
First Impression 1 12.396 12.396 3.853 0.052 
Mindset 1 1.776 1.776 0.552 0.459 
First Impression*Mindsetb 1 1.990 1.990 0.619 0.217 
 
Simple effects:      
     Simple effect of First Impression      
          under Mindset-Efficiencyb 1 12.388 12.388 3.850 0.026 
     Simple effect of First Impression      
          under Mindset-Effectivenessb 1 2.186 2.186 0.679 0.206 
      
b The hypothesis tests are one-tailed tests, therefore the interaction p-values have been halved. All other 







ANOVA Analysis: Effect of Perceived First Impression and Mindset on Auditors' Judgment of 
Inventory Valuation and the Risk of Material Misstatement 
      
Panel A: Dependent variable: Inventory Valuation (Adjusted R2=0.101) 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
Model 47 1.559E+12 33168641170 1.750 0.015 
Error 76 1.440E+12 18949560620   
Corrected Total 123 2.999E+12    
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
Gender 1 45208393200 45208393200 2.386 0.127 
First Impression (IFQ) 28 1021059854000 36466423360 1.924 0.013 
Mindset 1 32410624460 32410624460 1.710 0.195 
First Impression (IFQ)*Mindset 17 633551749900 37267749990 1.967 0.012 
Simple effects:      
     Simple effect of First Impression      
          under Mindset-Efficiencyb 1 1848325905 1848325905 0.078 0.006 
     Simple effect of First Impression      
             under Mindset-Effectivenessb 1 156027147100 156027147100 6.549 0.391 
      
Panel B: Dependent variable: Risk of Material Misstatement (Adjusted R2=0.038) 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
Model 46 140.693 3.059 0.901 0.644 
Error 77 261.267 3.393   
Corrected Total 123 401.960    
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
First Impression (IFQ) 28 79.981 2.856 0.842 0.689 
Mindset 1 4.193 4.193 1.236 0.270 
First Impression(IFQ)*Mindsetb 17 62.364 3.668 1.081 0.193 
      
Simple effects:      
     Simple effect of First Impression      
          under Mindset-Efficiencyb 1 10.676 10.676 3.293 0.036 
     Simple effect of First Impression      
          under Mindset-Effectivenessb 1 0.976 0.976 0.301 0.292 
 
b The hypothesis tests are one-tailed tests, therefore the interaction p-values have been halved. All other 







Research Study Materials  
Instructions: 
For this case study, please assume that you are an auditor for a client called ‘MicroClone, Inc.’, a 
manufacturer of IBM-compatible high-end personal computers. During this case, you will be asked to 
analyze the balance of finished goods inventory. There are currently 8,000 computers in MicroClone's 
finished goods inventory. 
 
A detailed analysis of MicroClone’s inventory revealed that 25% (2,000 units) of the finished goods 
inventory is comprised of 4th generation computers and the remaining 75% (6,000 units) is 
represented by 5th generation computers (the latest microprocessor chip available on the market). 
MicroClone’s inventory of 2,000 units of 4th generation computers is presently valued at cost ($1,000 
per unit), for a total of $2,000,000. 
 
It has come to your attention that there may be a problem concerning the 4th generation inventory: 
During the fourth quarter, MicroClone began shipping personal computers using the 5th generation 
chips. Therefore, it is possible that the value of the 4th generation computers remaining in the 
inventory might be overstated, because 4th generation computers will eventually become obsolete by 
industry standards. Consequently, the appropriate value of a 4th generation computer may be as low 
as $800 per computer, instead of $1,000 as currently valued. Thus, MicroClone’s estimate of 4th 
generation computers could be overstated by as much as 
$200 per unit, yielding a potential over-valuation of $400,000—at the most. However, it is quite 
possible that 4th generation computers are appropriately valued at $2,000,000 and that no write down 
in inventory is necessary. The next step of the audit is for you to speak with client personnel so that 
you can come to your own conclusion about the inventory valuation. 
 
Your supervisor has asked that you meet with the controller of MicroClone to discuss the inventory 
issue. This is your first year on the MicroClone audit, and this will be the first time you meet the 
controller. The supervisor’s instructions are as follows: 
------- 
 
Efficiency Mindset Condition 
"The firm is concerned about the way our professionals analyze clients' inventory valuations. 
Specifically, we are concerned that our auditors may conduct inefficient investigations when testing 
the inventory valuation, which may lead to excess costs. Speaking with the controller is one of the 
final steps in our audit program for MicroClone. My main concern is that we work efficiently on this 
audit so that we don't exceed our time budget. I need you to speak to the controller so we can 
efficiently complete our inventory valuation tests without incurring excess audit costs in this area." 
 
 
Effectivness Mindset Condition 




Specifically, we are concerned that our auditors may conduct ineffective investigations when testing 
the inventory valuation, which may lead to inappropriate conclusions. Speaking with the controller is 
one of the final steps in our audit program for MicroClone. My main concern is that we effectively 
perform the inventory testing, and I'm not concerned with how many hours we spend. I need you to 
speak to the controller so we can effectively perform our inventory valuation tests and reach the 




You will have the opportunity to interact with the controller via video. Your aim is to discuss with 
the controller the appropriate valuation estimate for the 4th generation computers, which can range 
from $1,600,000 to $2,000,000. Materiality for this client’s financial statements is 
$300,000. Therefore, there is some concern about this potential over-valuation situation. 
 
After the interview, you will be asked to make a decision as to the final inventory valuation amount 
for the 4th generation computers. It is in the best interest of the client company to maintain a high 
asset valuation. 
 
Script from video with accompanying dialogue from the participants 
The interview begins: 
 
You: “Good morning. I am part of the audit team and I would like to have a few minutes 
to chat about the valuation of the 4th generation computers.” 
-------- 
 
Positive First Impression Condition 
Controller: “Good morning! Come in! How can I help? I can make time for some questions now.” 
 
Negative First Impression Condition 
Controller: “You auditors always stop by at the worst times. Just come in. What do you need? 
Let’s just get it over with.” 
-------- 
You: “MicroClone has begun shipping personal computers using the 5th generation chips. 
We’re concerned that your 4th generation computers may have lost value, and therefore, 
are not properly valued. What evidence do you have that the 4th generation computers 
are properly valued?” 
 
Controller: “MicroClone prides itself on innovation. Our products are so popular that we are 
confident our customers are willing to pay a premium for our brand, even for older 
models.” 
 






Controller: “MicroClone has no history of inventory valuation problems. We’ve successfully sold 
nearly our entire stock of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd-generation computers without significant write-
downs of our inventory account. We are sure that the 4th generation computers will be the 
same.” 
You: “My records show that the 4th generation of computers are valued at $1,000 per unit. What 
evidence do you have that MicroClone will be able to sell all of your 4th generation 
computers at that price?” 
 
Controller: “We believe that the valuation of $1,000 per unit is reasonable. In fact, one of our sales 
managers has informed us that one of our competitors – MilleniCom – is currently out of 
4th generation computers. We just received a memo from MilleniCom inquiring about the 
number of 4th generation computers we have in stock. It seems that they are considering 
buying a large number of our 4th generation computers at our current selling price.” 
 
You:  “What if MilleniCom doesn’t purchase your 4th generation computers? Would you 
have to lower the $1,000 price to sell the remainder of those computers?” 
 
Controller: “We still shouldn’t have any problem selling them. We’ve got recent contracts signed by 
two universities specifying that all incoming students will be required to purchase 4th 
generation computers for the upcoming school year. So you see, we have other outlets 
for those computers.” 
 
You:  “Why would the universities specify older generation computers when the 5th 
generation computers are available?” 
 
Controller: “The 5th generation computers are not stable yet. Our marketing manager sent over a 
memo saying that the 5th generation computers seem to suffer from an overheating 
problem. He suggests we advise customers to continue buying 4th generation 
computers. As a result, we don’t expect sales volume for the 4th generation computers 
to be affected by the introduction of 5th generation computers, thus 4th generation 
sales should remain steady over the next year.” 
 
You:  “My research shows that the 5th generation computers will be much faster than the 4th 
generation computers. Won’t many of your customers prefer to buy the 5th generation 
computers to take advantage of the improved technology?” 
 
Controller: “I don’t think that will be a problem. Our 4th generation computers can soon be upgraded 
with 5th generation chips, which will increase 4th generation performance to an equivalent 
of 5th generation computers. I just received a memo from our technical manager who 




generation computers at minimal cost. 
Given the upgradeability, we can probably sell these computers at the same price as 5th 
generation computers.” 
 
You:  “Why does MicroClone believe their customers would buy a 4th generation 
computer, and upgrade it, when they could simply buy a 5th generation computer?” 
 
Controller: “Our 5th generation computers are more expensive than previous models due to 
enhanced product features. Marketing analysis suggests that there will be steady demand 
for the 4th generation because many of our customers won’t buy at the higher price 
point.” 
 
You:  “What about the user experience between the 4th and 5th generation computers? Do 
customers demonstrate a preference for the 5th generation computers over the 4th 
generation?” 
 
Controller: “Actually no. Focus groups indicate that many of our customers would like to purchase 
4th generation computers in order to become familiar with our products before 
committing to our more expensive 5th generation computers.” 
 
You:  “Are there any other reasons you believe would demonstrate that the 4th 
generation computers are appropriately valued at $1,000?” 
 
Controller: “Yes. We can also export the 4th generation computers to developing markets where we 
probably sell them at our existing selling price. Our head of customer service sent me an 
email saying that our orders for 4th generation computers in China and India are 
expected to grow next year. I am sorry to have to end our discussion now, I have a 
meeting coming up.” 
 
You:  “No problem. Thank you for your time.” 
 
 
Inventory Valuation Questions 
1. What is your assessment of the risk of a material misstatement of the 4th generation computers 
in the inventory account? (9-point scale, Extremely low risk-Extremely high risk) 
2. Please provide an explanation of how you arrived at the assessment. 
3. Based on your understanding of the MicroClone, Inc. inventory account, what is the 
appropriate inventory valuation for the 4th generation computers? 
 
Post-experiment Questions 





2. How comfortable are you with asking the controller for more information about the 
inventory? (7-point scale, Very Uncomfortable-Very Comfortable) 
3. In your opinion, how likely will the controller be to accept your proposed inventory 
valuation? (7-point scale, Very Unlikely-Very Likely) 
4. How much did the evidence provided by the controller influence your inventory valuation 
decision? (7-point scale, Minimum Influence-Maximum Influence) 
5. How much did your impressions of the controller influence your inventory valuation 
decision? (7-point scale, Minimum Influence-Maximum Influence) 
6. I believe this client to be trustworthy. (7-point scale, Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree) 
7. I believe this client to be competent. (7-point scale, Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree) 
8. I believe this client to be honest. (7-point scale, Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree) 
9. Please rate the controller on each of the following items by clicking in the circle that best represents your 















3. Years of Work Experience 
4. Type of Accounting Firm 
o Big 4 Firm 
o Regional Firm 
o Local Firm 
o Other 
5. Role in Accounting Firm 
o Staff Auditor 
o Senior Auditor 
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AU 316 (AICPA 2002) recommends that auditors incorporate “elements of unpredictability” in 
selecting audit procedures to be performed in response to the assessed risks of material misstatement due 
to fraud. In keeping with the audit policy recommendations, auditors could vary the nature, timing, or 
extent of audit procedures. Prior research suggests that designing unpredictable procedures can assist with 
the detection of fraud that is concealed from standard audit procedures (Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009; 
Fellingham and Newman 1985; Shibano 1990). Changing the nature of audit procedures fits with 
suggestions from prior research about designing unpredictable procedures to assist with fraud detection as 
a change in timing or extent still uses the same audit procedures from prior years. Erickson et al. (1997) 
provide evidence that changing the nature of audit procedures would be more effective with fraud 
detection. However, archival and experimental research suggests that auditors continue to collect the 
same audit evidence items yearly, keeping the nature of the evidence constant (Bedard 1989; Glover et al. 
2003). In addition, fraud studies find that when auditors are explicitly asked to assess fraud risks they 
change the extent but not the nature of audit evidence (Zimbelman 1997). Bedard et al. (1999) find the 
same results in auditing studies unrelated to fraud. Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) suggest that these 
findings regarding the lack of variation in the nature of audit procedures is troubling since changing the 
extent of audit evidence collection is not as effective as changing the nature of audit procedures. One 
reason for the lack of the variation in the nature of audit procedures is the employment of audit checklists 
(Asare and Wright 2004). When the audit plan is too predictable, auditees familiar with the audit plan can 
anticipate which areas will receive lesser attention (or no attention) and intentionally commit fraud with 
very low risk of being detected (Bowlin 2011). Thus, changing the nature of audit procedures is critical to 
fraud detection. This study examines an additional benefit of varying audit procedures. We posit that 
changing the nature of audit procedures may deter fraud because it creates ambiguity, and individuals 




Individuals’ aversion to ambiguity influences the decisions they make. Individuals who are averse 
to ambiguity prefer to take action on an issue when the probabilities of success or failure are clearly 
defined (Ellsberg 1961). Given the chance, individuals tend to prefer the option with known probabilities 
over the option with unknown probabilities (Ellsberg 1961). In the same vein, Frish and Baron (1988) 
find that individuals are averse to missing information when making decisions especially when the 
information can be manipulated by another party or is known only after a decision has been made. 
Changing the nature of audit procedures will result in individuals’ inability to predict what the auditors 
will be testing, creating ambiguity and increasing the perception that individuals do not have adequate 
amount of information about the auditors plans and the risk of fraud detection. When the chosen audit 
procedures for the upcoming audit are unknown, the perception of the risk of detection is higher than 
when the audit procedures are predictable. Individuals will then be less likely to attempt to commit fraud 
when auditors are constantly varying the nature of audit procedures. In addition to increasing the 
probability of fraud detection, changing the nature of audit procedures can possibly lead to fraud 
deterrence. 
There has been a 13% increase in the narcissism scores on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory 
(Raskin and Terry 1988) between the early 1980’s to 2006 (Twenge et al. 2008). The increase in 
narcissism scores is especially predominant among the Millennial Generation (Twenge and Campbell 
2009). Prior psychology research suggest that narcissists’ self-perceived superiority is a major element of 
their self-esteem (Raskin & Terry 1988; Paulhus 1998). Within the area of auditing, Johnson et al. (2013) 
find that narcissistic managers are perceived by auditors to pose a greater fraud risk. When a task is 
perceived as a challenge, narcissists interpret this as a great opportunity to prove that they are superior 
over others (Wallace and Baumeister 2002). Changing the nature of audit procedures will make the 




view the unpredictability as a challenge, they are more likely to attempt to commit fraud to demonstrate 
that they are superior over others and the auditors. The variation in audit procedures might fuel 
narcissistic individuals to commit fraud to satiate their need to be superior to the system. In this situation, 
changing the nature of audit procedures might not deter fraud, but actually lead to an increase in fraud 
occurrence. 
This study examines the individual’s perception of the ambiguity present in the yearly variation of 
audit procedures and how his/her aversion to ambiguity and narcissistic trait influence the individual’s 
decision to commit fraud. To do so, we conduct a 2x2 interactive simulation, collecting data from a 
simulation involving 141 participants playing the role of inventory managers of a hypothetical firm in 
which managers, who know about the likelihood that auditors vary audit procedures, have the opportunity 
to choose to misappropriate assets of the company’s inventory or choose not to commit fraud at all. We 
find that when individuals are presented with both variation absent or variation present conditions, they 
are more likely to prefer the variation absent condition when they want to commit inventory theft. We 
also find that when auditors vary the nature of audit procedures, individuals perceive the risk of detection 
to be greater than when auditors keep the same audit procedures from year to year. 
This study makes several contributions to extant literature. First, we extend prior research on 
ambiguity aversion to the fraud detection and prevention setting, focusing on potential fraudster’s 
perception of auditors’ audit planning decisions. Previous ambiguity aversion research within the 
accounting area centered on auditors’ reaction to ambiguous situations. This is the first study to examine 
how auditors can use ambiguity aversion to their benefit and increase the effectiveness of the audit. 
Second, we examine how ambiguity aversion is influenced by various personality characteristics such as 
narcissism. From a practical perspective, this paper could aid auditors and regulators by showing that 




with fraud detection. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides a background review of the 
relevant literature and the hypotheses development. Section III outlines the research method and the 
experimental design of the study. Section IV provides results of the experimental study and Section V 
includes a discussion and concluding remarks. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Variation in the Nature of Audit Procedures 
Variation in audit procedures are used not only to assist in fraud detection (Wilks and Zimbelman 
2004; AICPA 2002), but also to assist accounting firms with lowering audit risk to reach the planned 
audit risk (Colbert and Luehlfing 1996; Bedard, Mock, and Wright 1999). Prior research indicates that 
increasing audit evidence persuasiveness by increasing the extent and nature of audit tests will lead to 
lower audit risks (Mock and Wright 1993, 1999; Elder and Allen 2003). However, Budescu et al. (2012) 
find contrasting evidence with regards to the decrease in audit risk when there is variation in extent and 
nature of audit procedures. They suggest that variation in the nature and extent of audit procedures does 
not automatically lead to enhanced audit effectiveness as audit risk can potentially increase, not decrease, 
depending on the type of variation in audit procedures and the type of misstatement. 
AU 316 states that how an audit is conducted is affected by the judgment of the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud (AICPA 2002). One factor revolves around the predictability of auditing 
procedures: 
“The auditor should incorporate an element of unpredictability in the 
selection from year to year of auditing procedures to be performed – for 
example, performing substantive tests of selected account balances and 
assertions not otherwise tested due to their materiality or risk, adjusting 
the timing or testing from that otherwise expected, using differing 
sampling methods, and performing procedures at different locations or at 





Auditors exhibit a great dependence on prior year audit programs, which leads to using a large majority of 
the same procedures (Bennett and Hatfield 2012; Bedard 1989). When the audit plan is too predictable, 
individuals might recognize the patterns and develop fraud schemes that circumvent yearly audit 
procedures (Bowlin 2011). To address the identified risks of material misstatement due to fraud, 
variations in the nature, timing, or extent of audit procedures that involve substantive testing and tests of 
operating effectiveness of controls need to be conducted depending on the risks identified, the account 
balances, classes of transactions, and related assertions (AU 316.51). The nature of audit tests involve the 
types of tests available to collect evidence, extent refers to the increase or decrease in sample size used for 
testing, whereas the timing of audit tests refers to when an audit test is performed or the time period used 
for audit evidence collection (Bedard, Mock, and Wright 1999; Wilks and Zimbelman 2004). 
Mock and Wright (1993) find that changing the extent of audit procedures is the primary method 
auditors use to address differences in audit risk. Fraud studies find that auditors do not change the nature 
of planned evidence even when prompted to assess fraud risk, suggesting a greater preference towards 
changing the extent and timing over the nature of audit procedures (Bedard 1989; Zimbelman 1997; 
Glover et al. 2003). A study done to examine the effects of SAS no. 82 on documented changes to the 
planned audit program by Mock and Turner (2005) indicate that there was a slight increase in variation in 
nature of audit procedures from Year 1 to Year 2. This suggests that auditors are willing to modify the 
nature of audit procedures based on SAS no. 82 evaluations. A possible explanation for auditors’ lack of 
variation in the nature of audit procedures is the limited availability of new or unique evidence items to 
employ (Wilks and Zimbelman 2004). To overcome this issue of lack of awareness on methods to vary 
audit procedures, AU 316 provides recommendations and examples for varying the nature, timing, and 
extent of audit procedures for areas such as inventory quantities, revenue recognition, management 




The Nature of Audit Procedures 
Auditors conduct test of controls and perform substantive testing (AICPA 2002). Within the two 
broad categories of test of controls and substantive testing, auditors have available audit tests that differ in 
perceived efficiency and effectiveness (Bedard et al. 1999). Varying the nature of audit procedures may 
involve the use of external evidence from public records, physically inspecting assets instead of relying 
on numbers from spreadsheets, or using computer-assisted audit techniques in addition to performing 
confirmations or requiring different documents that test the same accounts. Interviewing additional 
employees for more detailed information, changing the testing location, and making oral inquiries of 
major customers and suppliers are also ways to vary the nature of collecting audit evidence (AU 316.53). 
Varying the nature of audit procedures is considered to be more effective in a strategic setting than 
varying the extent and timing of audit evidence collection (Wilks and Zimbelman 2004). 
Ambiguity Aversion 
Ambiguity is defined as uncertainty over probabilities (Camerer and Weber 1992). 
 
Ambiguity aversion, identified by Ellsberg (1961), shows how ambiguity influences the use of 
probabilities when individuals’ make decisions and their preferences for options with known versus 
unknown probabilities. Also known as the Ellsberg Paradox, Ellsberg uses a thought experiment to show 
the paradox in decision theory when an individual’s choice violates the expectations of Savage’s (1954) 
subjective expected utility theory (Ellsberg 1961). Below is a brief illustration of the thought experiment 
(Ellsberg 1961): 
The first scenario: 
There are two urns each with 100 balls: Urn 1, containing 50 red balls and 50 black 
balls, and Urn 2, containing an unknown proportion of red balls and black balls. 
Individuals are given the opportunity to select which urn they would like to make a bet 
on and draw a ball from. They will receive $100 if they draw a red ball when they make 
a red bet and vice versa. They would receive nothing if they draw a ball that does not 
correspond to the color of the bet. 
 




An urn containing 90 equal-sized balls has 30 red balls and 60 black and yellow balls in 
unknown proportions. There will be two lotteries. Individuals are asked to choose from 
two options (A or B, A’ or B’) for each lottery. Each lottery has a guaranteed reward of 
$100 and is based on different triggers. Individuals either receive $100 or $0 for 
each lottery. The probability of winning, p, is listed along with each option. 
 
The options for Lottery 1: 
A: A reward of $100 if a red ball is drawn (p=1/3). 
B: A reward of $100 is given if a black ball is drawn (0 ≤ p ≤ 2/3). 
The options for Lottery 2: 
A’: A reward of $100 if a red ball or a yellow ball is drawn (1/3 ≤ p ≤ 1). 
B’: A reward of $100 if a black ball or a yellow ball is drawn (p=2/3). 
 
Ellsberg (1961) finds that most individuals prefer Urn 1 in the first scenario regardless of hedging 
a red bet or a black bet, indicating that individuals’ prefer an outcome with known probability even when 
the likelihood is the same (p=0.5 for red and p=0.5 for black). The risk for both outcomes is the same, 
because the potential payoff or loss is the same for both urns. This two-urn example shows that 
individuals’ preference is driven by aversion to ambiguity, and not aversion to risk (Gilboa 2009). The 
probability of getting a reward with a red or black bet with Urn 2 is 0≤ p ≤ 1. For the second scenario, 
individuals’ prefer options A and B’ over A’ and B because the precise probability for winning the $100 
is known and options A’ and B have vague probability distributions. The subjective expected utility 
theory would suggest that individuals would choose Urn 2, options A and A’. Both scenarios show that 
individuals prefer the options with known probabilities because of their aversion to ambiguity, not 
because of their aversion to risk. 
In addition, Ellsberg (1961) finds that individuals are generally ambiguity-averse when given a 
choice between purely chance-based prospects but they would prefer ambiguous ability- based prospects 
over unambiguous chance-based prospects. This is due to the positive perceptions of individual’s 
competence, which is expected to overcome the ambiguity involved in situations where individuals are 
perceived to have some control over the outcome (Heath & Tversky 1991). Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) 




ambiguity whereas when the probability of loss is high, people react in a less conservative manner. 
Individuals are averse to missing information when making decisions (Frisch & Baron 1988). This is true 
especially when that information is known and can be manipulated by another party or is made known 
after a decision has been made (Frish & Baron 1988). 
Varying the audit procedures every year would result in individuals’ perception of having missing 
information with regards to what will be tested and when the auditors will carry out the audit tests. The 
use of different audit procedures each year can be categorized as a chance-based prospect from the 
perspective of the individual as they have no control over the actions of the auditors. Audit procedures 
which are set and unchanging from year-to-year allows individuals to learn the patterns and find ways to 
work around it. Research in psychology suggest that how people react to ambiguity is influenced by the 
incentives (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985). Individuals who would like to increase their financial position 
would have the incentive to commit fraud but they would prefer to avoid the costs that would be incurred 
if they get caught. Since the goal of fraudsters is generally to perpetrate the fraud for as long as possible 
and avoid getting caught (diNapoli 2008), they would have to predict which audit procedures are 
employed each year and figure out the probabilities of success based on the different sets of audit 
procedures used. 
Given that individuals are generally averse to ambiguity when the prospect is chance- based, we 
posit that when auditors vary the audit plan each year, individuals will be less likely to commit fraud due 
to the ambiguity involved in the variation of audit procedures. When the audit procedures are predictable 
and unchanging from year to year, individuals will be more likely to commit fraud because of their 
knowledge of the audit plan and the reduced probability of the detection of the fraud. Using an 
experimental setting to test the variation in the nature of audit procedures is crucial as auditors rarely 




leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Incorporating an element of unpredictability through a change in the 
nature of audit procedures will decrease the likelihood that individuals 
choose to commit fraud. 
 
Narcissism 
Although we will collect data on several personality characteristics, we have a specific prediction 
regarding the effect of narcissism on susceptibility to ambiguity aversion. The American Psychiatric 
Association (2000) defines narcissism as a pervasive and enduring pattern of grandiose behavior (in 
fantasy or actual behavior), the need for admiration, and a lack of empathy. Narcissists also tend to be 
strongly motivated to approach desirable outcomes but only weakly motivated to avoid negative 
outcomes (Foster and Trimm 2008). It would seem that narcissists manipulate public impressions by 
exaggerating their talents but they actually exaggerate their talents and abilities because they truly believe 
they are superior over others (Raskin et al. 1991). Narcissists are especially passionate in their pursuit of 
personal glory (John and Robins 1994; Robins and Beer 2001). They are more concerned about self-
enhancement when compared with other individuals and this can encourage narcissists to invest 
maximum effort when opportunities for self-enhancement arise (John and Robins 1994; Wallace and 
Baumeister 2002). When the task goal is perceived as a difficult challenge, narcissists interpret this as a 
perfect opportunity to demonstrate their superiority over others; Task success is taken as an impressive 
sign of personal superiority and when tasks are difficult, narcissists tend to perform well (Wallace and 
Baumeister 2002). Conversely, when tasks are easy, it does not reflect exceptional ability and leads to 
lower motivation/desire to perform the tasks (Wallace and Baumeister 2002). 
The appearance of performing well at work and reaping great financial benefits to seem superior 
over others financially is self-enhancing. If committing fraud could increase a narcissist’s level of wealth 
and/or authority (feeling of superiority) within the company, this would be perceived as a desirable 




fraud would seem to be a negative outcome that factors much less into the decision to commit fraud. The 
knowledge that auditors will vary audit procedures will raise the difficulty of the task, possibly driving 
narcissistic individuals to commit fraud. When audit procedures are predictable, successfully perpetrating 
a fraud scheme would seem as if it can be done by anyone, decreasing the narcissists’ desire to exhibit 
exceptional ability and their motivation to commit fraud. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H2A: When variation in the nature of audit procedures is present, the fraud 
occurrence proportion of narcissistic individuals will be higher than when 
variation in the nature of audit procedures is absent. 
 
H2B: When variation in the nature of audit procedures is present, the fraud 
occurrence proportion of non-narcissistic individuals will be lower than when 
variation in the nature of audit procedures is absent. 
 
 
This study specifically looks at the “Prevent and Deter Controls” piece of the fully ascribed meta-
model of white collar crime presented by Dorminey et al. (2012). The meta-model of white collar crime is 
depicted in Figure 4-1. The ambiguity created from auditors’ variation in audit procedures relates to the 
deterrence piece that is the main focus of this study. To be able to focus on the fraud deterrence piece, we 
incorporate elements from the Perpetrator(s) and the Crime triangles to provide individuals with the 
opportunity to commit fraud and convert the gains of the fraud into personal wealth. 
[Insert Figure 4-1 About Here] 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHODS 
Participants 
This study is conducted in two parts. 270 participants elected to participate in Part One of this 
study via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). They had to be at least 18 years of age and located in the 
United States. A study by Kees et al. (2017) find that MTurk participants are older, more educated, and 




companies like Qualtrics and Lightspeed. The quality of the data received from MTurk is also better than 
the data obtained from other samples. Overall, they find that MTurk is a viable platform to recruit 
participants. Participants were told that three days after completing Part One, the Part Two of this study 
will be available on MTurk. 141 participants completed Part Two over 10 days. We tested the hypotheses 
using the 141 observations. The mean age of participants is 34.49 years and the average years of work 
experience is 18.32 years. Table 4-1 presents the participant demographics of the 141 participants. 
Participants received monetary compensation in exchange for participation. They were also awarded an 
additional bonus depending on their performance in the simulation in the second part of the study. 
[Insert Table 4-1 About Here] 
 
Design 
This study involved a 2x2 experiment in which we manipulated the variation of the nature of audit 
procedures (auditing both or only one warehouse – triggering ambiguity aversion) and we measured 
participants’ levels of narcissism (low or high). Data was collected electronically via Qualtrics survey 
platform. A 10-period simulation was designed to reflect the variation or lack thereof in the audit 
procedures. Participants were told that there were two warehouses and each warehouse had five bins. 
Participants then had the opportunity to indicate in each period whether they chose to take an asset from 
one of the five bins in Warehouse A, one of the five bins in Warehouse B, or not to commit fraud at all. In 
every period, there was a 20% chance that the fraud would be discovered by the auditors. The repeated-
trial design of the experiment allowed participants to incorporate the knowledge of audit procedures used 
by the auditors in the previous periods when making decisions for subsequent periods. 
Pilot Tests 
Prior to arriving at the design and methods used in the study, we conducted 6 rounds of pilot tests 
with students and on MTurk. In the first round with three independent variables (narcissism, variation in 




versions of the study. The difference between the two versions was the use of audit extent framing (just 
one week vs. one entire week) as the third independent variable for one version and the use of 
compensation framing (short term vs. long term) as the third independent variable for the second version. 
This pilot was done to ensure that any issues with the simulation was identified and corrected before we 
opened the study on MTurk. 
On MTurk, we conducted five different pilot tests and had 1024 participants complete Part One of 
the study. A total of 665 participants completed Part Two. Analysis of each round of the MTurk pilot tests 
were conducted with observations that have complete Part One and Part Two responses. The first MTurk 
pilot test was similar to the student pilot test. We tested the two different versions and decided to move 
forward with the compensation framing version. In addition, the results from the pilot test was 
unanticipated and a departure from theory. The results suggested that participants were stealing more 
when auditors varied the nature of audit procedures. This prompted changes to the wording in the case 
background to clarify the audit procedures and the addition of some case comprehension questions. We 
also included a question after the simulation asking participants to identify their audit procedure 
preference should they have an interest in taking a processor. 
The second MTurk pilot test with the compensation framing version was conducted after making 
changes from the previous pilot. Results indicated that the proportion of fraud occurrence was higher 
when auditors varied the nature of audit procedures, however, over 80% of participants indicated in the 
post-simulation question that they preferred it when auditors did not vary the nature of audit procedures if 
they wanted to take a processor. The proportion of fraud occurrence was higher when compensation was 
framed as short-term compared to when compensation was framed as long-term. We were perplexed by 
the difference between behavior and what the participants indicated they preferred and decided that 




discrepancy between action and preference. 
For the third MTurk pilot test, we changed the design of the simulation, exposing participants to 
both the variation present and variation absent conditions. They were told at the start of each period if 
auditors were going to audit only one warehouse or both warehouses. 
Results still showed the proportion of fraud occurrence to be higher when participants were told 
that auditors were varying the nature of audit procedures. Regarding compensation framing, results for 
the long-term and short-term conditions were similar to the earlier pilot test. Also similar to the pilot test 
before this one, participants indicated that they preferred the variation absent condition if they wanted to 
steal. Further discussion about the practicality of the compensation framing variable lead to the exclusion 
of compensation framing in the study. Although results for compensation framing were in the expected 
direction, it is not possible for companies to withhold compensation for multiple periods to reduce the 
proportion of fraud occurrence. As the inclusion of this variable would not lead to practical changes in the 
field, we felt that the exclusion of this variable moving forward was justified. 
Due to inconsistency between action and preference of participants, we took a closer look at the 
study design and wording. We made changes to the wording of the questions and case background based 
on suggestions from an experienced experimental design researcher. The biggest change came from 
replacing the word “audit” in the simulation as most individuals might have associated that with IRS tax 
audits. Also, we included an open-ended question asking participants why others would indicate that they 
preferred the variation-absent condition but ended up taking more processors when the auditors varied the 
nature of audit procedures. Upon making the changes described above, the fourth MTurk pilot test was 
conducted as a 2 (variation in the nature of audit procedures) x 2 (narcissism) experiment whereby 
participants were only exposed to either the variation-absent or variation-present condition. Results were 




the difference in proportion of fraud occurrence between the variation conditions decreased. 
The fifth and last MTurk pilot test was conducted with one major departure from the fourth 
MTurk pilot test: the simulation was conducted by exposing participants to both the variation-absent and 
variation-present conditions for different periods. Just as with the previous pilot tests, the proportion of 
fraud occurrence was higher in the variation-present condition compared to the variation-absent 
condition. Approximately 55% of participants indicated that they preferred it when auditors kept the 
nature of the audit procedures constant when they wanted to take a processor. A closer look at 
participants’ preference and their actions indicated that approximately 80% of the participants acted in 
accordance with their preference. Three changes were made to arrive at the simulation design employed 
in this study: (1) included wording in the case background to specify what auditors did in the past and 
how that would differ moving forward (in the variation present-condition) or how it would remain the 
same (in the variation-absent condition), (2) restricting participants to either the variation-present or 
variation-absent condition, and (3) adding questions from the Theory of Planned Behavior in Part One of 
the study. Separating participants into the different conditions allowed us to ask about their intentions to 
steal before the simulation began and to compare the response about intentions between the two 
conditions. Incorporating questions from the Theory of Planned Behavior gave us the opportunity to 
potentially examine participants’ attitudes and beliefs about stealing and their actions in the simulation. 
Table 4-2 summarizes the pilot tests changes across times. 
[Insert Table 4-2 about here] 
Variation of Audit Procedures 
We manipulated the variation (change in nature) of the audit procedure in the simulation. The 
simulation was in Part Two of the study. Participants were told that in the past, the auditors of the 




and in each period, auditors would split their time at both warehouses and randomly select one bin from 
each warehouse to perform a count to verify the number of processors. In the variation absent condition, 
participants were informed that consistent with what the auditors have done in the past, the auditors 
would continue to split their time between both warehouses in each period. They would randomly select 
one bin from each warehouse to perform counts. In the variation present condition, participants were told 
that moving forward the auditors would randomly select two bins from only one warehouse to perform 
verification counts. However, the participants would not know which warehouse was selected by the 
auditors until after they made the decision to take a processor or refrain from doing so. Regardless of the 
decision the participants made in each period, they were notified after that decision about the warehouse 
chosen by the auditors. Therefore, they started each new period knowing the specific warehouse the 
auditors chose in the period before. In each period, participants had eleven choices: (1-5) yes, they want 
take a computer processor from Bin 1 [2/3/4/5] of Warehouse A, (6-10) yes, they want to take a computer 
processor from Bin 1 [2/3/4/5] of Warehouse B, and (11) no, they do not want to take any computer 
processors. Ambiguity is introduced in this study through the need for participants to guess which bin and 
warehouse the auditors would select and then having to make a decision that would reduce their chances 
of detection. It is important to note that the risk of detection across both the variation absent and variation 
present conditions are the same. 
Narcissism 
The second independent variable is the level of participants’ narcissism. This variable defines the 
participant, characterized by a grandiose self-concept, a strong sense of entitlement, a tendency to exploit 
others, and a lack of empathy. This variable was measured using the Extreme Factor of the Narcissism 
Spectrum Scale (NSS) (Malkin 2015). The NSS has a list of 9 items that reflect narcissistic sentiments 
and is broken down into three factors: Extreme, Healthy, and Echoism. Individuals are considered to 




on the Echoism factor it means they lack narcissistic qualities. A high score for the Healthy factor 
indicates an association with few indicators of psychopathy and positive attributes such as self-esteem 
(Malkin 2015). Participants completed the NSS in Part One of the study and the Extreme factor was used 
to categorize individuals as narcissistic or non-narcissistic in this study. 
Ambiguity Aversion 
Ambiguity aversion was measured using the Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance Scale-
II (MSTAT-II) (McLain 2009). This 13-item 5-point Likert scale has a Cronbach alpha of 0.83 and 
reliability of 0.82. This MSTAT-II scale has a higher reliability when compared to alternative measures 
such as Budner’s (1962) Tolerance of Ambiguity Scale, which has a Cronbach alpha of 0.47, and 
provides a more valid measurement of ambiguity tolerance in contexts beyond social psychology 
(McLain 2009). Just like the NSS, participants completed the MSTAT-II in Part One of the study. 
Dependent Variable – Proportion of Fraud Occurrence 
In each period, participants have 11 different options. Options one to five: yes, they want take a 
computer processor from Bin 1 [2/3/4/5] of Warehouse A; Options six to 10: yes, they want to take a 
computer processor from Bin 1 [2/3/4/5] of Warehouse B; and option 11: no, they do not want to take any 
computer processors. Fraud is deemed to have occurred when participants indicate in the simulation that 
they elect to take a computer processor from one of bins from either warehouse for a particular period. If 
participants indicated that they would take a processor (options one to 10), it was coded as 1 whereas if 
they decided not to take a processor it was coded as 0. The dependent variable is computed by adding up 
each participant’s decision for the periods they were employed divided by the number of periods they 
remain employed in the simulation to get a proportion of fraud occurrence. Data on the dependent 
variable was collected using Qualtrics. 
Theory of Planned Behavior 




aspects: behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs, and control beliefs. Behavioral beliefs are beliefs about the 
possible outcomes of the behavior and the evaluations of these outcomes. For each individual, behavioral 
beliefs lead to the individual’s attitude towards the behavior. Normative beliefs refer to the beliefs about 
the expectations of others and the motivation to adhere to these expectations. Individual’s subjective 
norms are the result of their normative beliefs. Control beliefs, which leads to perceived behavioral 
control, relate to the presence and power of factors that may impede or facilitate the behavior. Together, 
an individual’s attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control direct the 
development of behavioral intention. When attitude towards the behavior, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control are favorable, the intention to perform the behavior of interest would be 
greater than if the perception of the three factors are not favorable. Intentions therefore have a strong 
effect on actual behavior (Ajzen 2018). Figure 4-2 depicts the theory in diagram form. 
[Insert Figure 4-2 about here] 
 
Due to the contrast in participants’ preference and actions in the pilot tests, we included the 
Theory of Planned Behavior to assist with discerning and identifying why participants might prefer one 
option and act differently when another less-preferred option is presented. We are mainly interested in 
comparing participants’ responses to questions from the three factors and how that relates to their 
intentions to steal and whether it corresponds to the proportion of fraud occurrence in the simulation. For 
each factor, a lower score indicates a more favorable perception towards stealing compared to a higher 
score. As such, there should be an inverse relationship between the scores for each of the three factors and 
participants’ intention to steal (LIKELIHOOD_STEAL). There should also be an inverse relationship 







Besides the NSS and the MSTAT-II, participants answered questions tailored from the Theory of 
Planned Behavior (Beck and Ajzen 1991) regarding the behavior of taking an item from their employer, 
gambling habits, and demographic-related questions in Part One of the study. We also asked if 
participants have ever had any interaction with internal and external auditors. We controlled for all these 
variables in this study. 
Procedures 
The experiment was split into two parts. Participants saw the description to Part One of this study 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk. In Part One, participants completed the MSTAT-II, NSS, Theory of 
Planned Behavior, gambling attitudes, and demographic questions. Participants who completed Part One 
were then notified three days later to complete Part Two on MTurk. Email reminders were sent out to 
participants approximately one week after they completed Part One. In Part Two, participants were told 
that the experiment was a simulation of the audit portion of inventory testing for Piccolo Processors, Inc., 
a company that manufactures and ships computer processors to its clients. The company has two 
warehouses and the participant were asked to assume that he/she has a role which gave him/her access to 
both warehouses. For each period that they remained an employee of Piccolo Processors, Inc., they would 
receive a salary of 5 Lira ($0.20). Participants knew that they could take a processor from the warehouses 
each period and sell it for 20 Lira ($0.80) each period. They were then informed of the auditors’ history of 
performing inventory verification and their audit strategy moving forward. There was a 20% chance that 
auditors would detect that a processor was missing and if the theft was detected, the participants would 
lose their salary for that particular period and be terminated from the company. The simulation would 
then end. After reading the case materials, participants had to correctly answer all the comprehension 
check questions before starting the first period of the simulation. 




five bins in Warehouse A, any of the five bins in Warehouse B, or if they did not want to take any 
processors. After they have made their decision, participants were asked about their belief about the 
likelihood the auditors would detect that a processor was missing. They would then receive information 
about which warehouse was chosen by the auditors (if they were in the variation present condition) and if 
the auditors detected that a processor was missing during the inventory counts (if participants indicated 
that they wanted to take a processor). Participants then moved on to the next period. If the auditors 
detected that a processor was missing, the simulation ended immediately and participants would move on 
to the final section of the study. Participants who did not choose to take any processors or took a 
processor but did not get caught by the auditors would move on to the next section of the study after 
being employed by Piccolo Processors, Inc. for 10 periods. In the final section, participants answered a 
few process measures questions. 
Participants were paid $0.20 for participating in Part One, $0.20 per period for participation in the 
simulation in Part Two, plus $0.80 per period for successful fraud (undetected by the auditors in the 
audit). Solely from the simulation, participants can be compensated a minimum of $0 (if they decided to 
take a processor in the first period and it was detected by the auditors) and a maximum of $10 (if they 
decided to take a processor for all ten periods and it was undetected by the auditors). As an incentive for 
participants to complete both Part One and Part Two, participants were paid a $0.50 reward on top of any 
bonuses they may have earned through the simulation. Incorporating any rewards and the bonus based on 
their performance in the simulation, the minimum amount a participant could be paid for this entire study 
was $0.70 whereas the maximum amount was $10.70. After the completion of Part Two of the study, 
participants were compensated based on the decisions they made and the audit outcomes in the simulation 
within one week. The total time taken for both parts of the study was approximately 25 minutes. Figure 4-




[Insert Figure 4-3 about here] 
IV. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
As reported earlier, 270 participants from MTurk elected to participate in Part One of the study 
and from that number, 141 participants completed Part Two. The data from the 141 participants were 
used to test the hypotheses presented in this paper. The simulation generated 908 observation periods 
from the 141 participants for conducting empirical analysis.11 Of the 908 periods that were played in the 
simulation, participants chose to commit fraud during 394 of those periods. The fraud detection rate was 
set to 20% and was displayed at random through Qualtrics. 88 fraud occurrences, which was about 22% 
of all fraud occurrences, were detected. On a participant-level, 109 participants (77%) chose to commit 
fraud at least once during the simulation. Out of the 109 participants that chose to commit fraud, the 
average times participants took a processor during the 10-period simulation was 3.6. Figure 4-4 depicts 
the number of participants that chose to take a processor for each period of the simulation. Fraud 
occurrence (FRAUD_OCCURRENCE) is the number of periods participants decide to take a processor 
during the simulation. The dependent variable, FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION, or the number 
of periods participants chose to take a processor out of the number of periods played, has a minimum of 0 
and a maximum of 1. The mean proportion of fraud occurrence for all 141 participants is 0.58. Table 4-3 
presents descriptive statistics on key variables, including those that were used to conduct statistical tests 
as well as those not included but collected during the study. 
[Insert Table 4-3 and Figure 4-4 About Here] 
 
AMBIGUITY_AVERSION is the composite score from the MSTAT-II. The higher the score, the 
more averse to ambiguity an individual is. The NSS has three factors and the composite scores of each 
                                                          
11 The simulation lasted for 10 periods but if participants decided to commit fraud and the fraud was detected, the simulation ended 




factor lead to three different variables. Extreme narcissism (NARCISSISM), the variable central to this 
study, has a mean of 9.04. 
The Effect of Variation in the Nature of Audit Procedures on Individuals’ Decision to Commit 
Fraud 
The first hypothesis predicts that incorporating an element of unpredictability through a change in 
the nature of audit procedures will decrease the likelihood that individuals choose to commit fraud. 
Therefore, we expect that in the VARIATION_NATURE present condition, or when there is variation in 
nature of audit procedures, the proportion of fraud occurrence should be lower compared to the 
VARIATION_NATURE absent condition. Figure 4-5 presents the average proportion of fraud occurrence 
by the variation present/absent experimental condition. When variation is present, the average proportion 
of fraud occurrence is slightly higher (0.59) than when variation is absent (0.56). Results from a t-test 
comparing the means of FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION (untabulated) indicate that the 
difference between these means are not significant (t=0.426, p=0.335, one-tailed). Hypothesis 1 is not 
supported. 
[Insert Figure 4-5 About Here] 
 
Responses from the open-ended post-simulation question asking participants why individuals 
might steal when variation is present but indicate that they prefer to steal when variation is absent 
provides some insight into why Hypothesis 1 was not supported. Many participants responded with 
variations of “when the cat is away the mouse comes out to play”, suggesting that some participants 
perceived it to be easier to get away with fraud when auditors were busy at the other warehouse and that 
motivated them to steal more in the VARIATION_NATURE present condition. They felt that the odds of 
success were higher (50%) when all they needed to do was select the right warehouse compared to when 
auditors were testing inventory at both warehouses even though the actual chance of detection was the 




question was the desire of participants to obtain the highest amount of the simulation bonus possible. 
Some participants mentioned that even though they were in the VARIATION_NATURE present condition 
and perceived the risk of detection to be greater, they decided to steal anyway to get more compensation 
from their time spent on this MTurk study. A few participants who gave this reason also felt inclined to 
add that they would never actually steal from their employer. Before the simulation began, participants 
were asked about the likelihood (LIKELIHOOD_STEAL) that they would take a processor from either 
warehouse, with 0 being very unlikely and 100 being very likely. As a robustness check, a t-test 
comparing the means of the LIKELIHOOD_STEAL variable and the VARIATION_NATURE variable was 
conducted. Means from the LIKELIHOOD_STEAL variable suggest that when variation is present, 
individuals have a greater intention of taking a processor than when variation is absent. The untabulated 
results of the t-test indicate that the difference between the LIKELIHOOD_STEAL means when variation 
is absent or present is not significant (t=0.675, p=0.251, one-tailed). 
Questions related to the Theory of Planned Behavior were broken down into three variables: 
STEAL_ATTITUDE, STEAL_PERC_BEHAVIORAL_CONTR, and STEAL_SUBJECTIVE_NORMS 
respectively for the three factors that influence an individual’s behavioral intention. Analyzing the 
correlations between the three factors, LIKELIHOOD_STEAL, and 
FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION for all participants, STEAL_ATTITUDE and 
STEAL_PERC_BEHAVIORAL_CONTR have inverse relationships with LIKELIHOOD_STEAL and 
FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION. This is consistent with our expectation that individuals’ 
favorable attitude towards stealing and their perceived behavioral control will lead to a greater intention 
to steal and proportion of fraud occurrence during the simulation. However, contrary to expectations, the 
correlation between LIKELIHOOD_STEAL and STEAL_SUBJECTIVE_NORMS was positive. We find 




STEAL_SUBJECTIVE_NORMS. This suggests that even though individuals indicated that it was not the 
norm to steal and doing so will be frowned upon by others, the intention and actual stealing behavior 
show a disregard for what others might think about their actions. 
As the correlation test results for all observations were not as expected, we divided participants 
into the VARIATION_NATURE absent or present conditions. Examining observations in the 
VARIATION_NATURE absent condition, there are inverse relationships between the three Theory of 
Planned Behavior factors and the LIKELIHOOD_STEAL variable. The relationship between 
FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION and the three Theory of Planned Behavior factors are also in 
the opposite direction. When VARIATION_NATURE is present, the relationships between 
STEAL_ATTITUDE and STEAL_PERC_BEHAVIORAL_CONTR on LIKELIHOOD_STEAL and 
FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION are all in the opposite direction. The relationship between 
STEAL_SUBJECTIVE_NORMS and LIKELIHOOD_STEAL is positively correlated (r=0.348, p=0.004). 
This indicates that when participants were aware that auditors will vary the nature of audit procedures, 
they had a greater intention to steal even when they acknowledge that others would frown upon this 
behavior. Focusing on the proportion of fraud occurrence for participants who are in the 
VARIATION_NATURE present condition, STEAL_SUBJECTIVE_NORMS and 
FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION are also positively correlated (r=0.199, p=0.106, one-tailed). 
Results from these correlation tests and open-ended questions suggests that participants were more likely 
to have a higher proportion of fraud occurrence when auditors varied the nature of audit procedures in the 
simulation because they perceived it as a better opportunity take advantage of the company when the 
auditors were not testing in one of the warehouses. It is also likely that participants acted differently in the 
VARIATION_NATURE present condition even though it was not the condition that they preferred because 




positive correlation between the subjective norms factor and the intention and stealing behavior could be 
due to participants’ perception that their actions in this simulation will not be known by others and 
because they are not actually stealing from a real company, their actions will not be condemned by others. 
The perception of a great opportunity to steal when auditors might not be testing a warehouse and the 
knowledge that others would not know about the theft could explain why participants indicate that they 
prefer to steal when auditors do not vary the nature of audit procedures but actually steal when auditors 
vary the nature of audit procedures. 
The Effect of Narcissism and Ambiguity on the Proportion of Fraud Occurrence  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that when variation in the nature of audit procedures is present, the fraud 
occurrence proportion of (a) narcissistic individuals will be higher and (b) non-narcissistic individuals 
will be lower than when variation in the nature of audit procedures is absent. Table 4-4 presents the 
descriptive statistics by experimental condition for the FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION 
dependent variable. Cell means provide preliminary evidence consistent with our hypotheses that when 
the variation nature of audit procedures is present, narcissistic individuals will steal more whereas non-
narcissists will steal less when compared to the VARIATION_NATURE absent condition. 
[Insert Table 4-4 About Here] 
 
To formally test Hypothesis 2, a VARIATION_NATURE (absent vs. present) x NARCISSISM 
(continuous variable) ANCOVA was used to test differences between means for significance. We 
specifically examine how the absence or presence of variation in audit procedures and individuals’ 
narcissistic tendencies interact to influence the number of times they choose to commit fraud out of the 
number of periods they are in the simulation. Overall, results suggest that the interaction between an 




willingness to commit fraud (F(1,12)=5.767, p<0.001). Simple effects tests12 examining the narcissism 
conditions indicate that when individuals are narcissistic, the proportion of fraud occurrence is higher 
when variation is present compared to when variation is absent (p=0.065, one-tailed). This suggests that 
controlling for all the other variables, variation in the nature of audit procedures results in an increase in 
the proportion of fraud occurrence of narcissists. Hypothesis 2A is supported. Although the proportion of 
fraud occurrence when variation is present is lower than when variation is absent for non-narcissistic 
individuals, the difference is not significant (p=0.471, one tailed). Analysis of Figure 4-6
12 suggests an 
increase in the proportion of fraud occurrence for narcissists moving from the VARIATION_NATURE 
absent to the VARIATION_NATURE present conditions. Also, Figure 4-6 shows a slight decrease in the 
proportion of fraud occurrence for non-narcissistic individuals moving from the VARIATION_NATURE 
absent to the VARIATION_NATURE present conditions. Thus, we find partial support for H2. Results are 
summarized in Table 4-5. 
[Insert Table 4-5 and Figure 4-6 About Here] 
 
Additional Analyses 
Psychology theory (Raskin and Terry 1988) predicts that it is important for narcissistic individuals 
to believe that they are superior over the company and its controls. When a task is deemed to be more 
challenging, narcissists are more motivated to attempt it than if the task is deemed to be easy and can be 
easily accomplished by any individual. T-tests (untabulated) of process measure variables shows that the 
narcissistic individuals indicated that it was more important for them to feel superior over the company 
and its controls compared to non- narcissists (t=1.318, p=0.093, one-tailed). Narcissists also place a 
greater importance on taking processors just to see if they can get away with it (t=3.712, p<0.001, one-
tailed) and indicate that they are confident they can successfully hide the theft from the auditor when 
                                                          




compared to non- narcissists (t=2.798, p=0.003, one-tailed). These results provide a better understanding 
of why the proportion of fraud occurrence increased when auditors varied the nature of audit procedures 
in the simulation. 
For each period, participants were asked about the likelihood a missing processor would be 
detected regardless of whether they chose to take a processor or not. T-tests comparing the means of the 
belief that the missing processor will be detected indicate that when VARIATION_NATURE is present, 
participants believe that the chances of auditor detection is greater than when VARIATION_NATURE is 
absent (t=3.840, p<0.001, one tailed). Dividing the sample into periods when participants chose to steal 
versus periods when they did not steal, the belief that the missing processor will be detected is still higher 
when VARIATION_NATURE is present than when VARIATION_NATURE is absent (steal: t=1.857, 
p=0.032, one tailed; no steal: t=3.418, p<0.001, one tailed). The results here make our findings for 
Hypothesis 1 more unanticipated given the perceived risks to successfully take a processor is higher for 
the VARIATION_NATURE present condition, the proportion of fraud occurrence should be lower. When 
participants were presented with both conditions and asked which condition they would prefer assuming 
that they would take a processor, 57.4% of the participants chose the VARIATION_NATURE absent 
condition. Once again, this suggests that individuals believed that it was easier to get away with inventory 
theft when auditors did not vary the nature of audit procedures. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This study examines the impact of variation in the nature of audit procedures and individuals’ 
narcissistic tendencies on willingness to commit fraud. Auditors generally use the same audit programs 
from year to year. When the audit plan becomes too predictable, individuals might recognize the patterns 
and take advantage of areas where auditors are less likely to test. 




individuals “on their toes”. The ambiguity introduced from the unpredictability can reduce individuals’ 
intention to attempt fraud, increasing the perception that the risk of detection is higher than it would be if 
auditors keep the same audit plan from year to year. This idea is reinforced by our finding that individuals 
prefer for auditors to maintain the same audit procedure than to vary the audit procedures if individuals 
wanted to commit inventory theft. In this study we also find that when auditors vary the nature of audit 
procedures, narcissists view it as a challenge and are more likely to steal to see if they can get away with 
it. Narcissists are more likely to commit fraud then because it is important for them to feel superior over 
the company and its controls when compared to non-narcissists. This ends up increasing the proportion of 
fraud occurrence when auditors vary the nature of audit procedures because narcissistic individuals view 
it as a greater challenge than when auditors stick to the same audit plan. 
The consequence of auditor detection in this simulation is not the same as the many consequences 
individuals face in reality when they are guilty of stealing from their company. The difference in pressure 
in this simulation compared to what happens in real life could cause individuals to be more daring and 
increase their willingness to commit fraud since the upside to successful theft is much higher than the 
downside of getting caught by the auditors. We could be seeing a higher rate of fraud in the study 
compared to theft rates auditors/fraud experts see in the field because ethical considerations for this 
simulation does not mirror the considerations individuals go through when they have to actually go 
through with the fraud. Even though the magnitude of the ethical consideration is not the same for a 
simulation, participants had commented that they “felt dirty” or “felt bad about what they did” in the 
simulation but they decided to take processors anyway for the extra cash. We believe that the ability to 
elicit such feelings through the simulation shows that the case is somewhat realistic. 
The results from the study provide new insight into the impact of variation in audit procedures on 




result in the perception of a higher risk of detection if individuals are looking to commit fraud. However, 
auditors need to be aware that if there are many narcissists within the company who are familiar with the 
audit plan, variation in the nature of audit procedures might not be the best strategy as it might increase 
fraud occurrence when narcissists see it as a challenge. If auditors are aware of such a situation, it might 
be better to vary the timing or extent of audit procedures. Future research can look into how variation in 
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 TABLE 4-1    
Participant Demographics 
   
Number Percent 
Gender Female  65 46.10% 
 Male  76 53.90% 
 n  141 100.00% 
Interacted with Internal Auditors Yes 
 
60 42.55% 
 No  81 57.45% 
 n  141 100.00% 
Interacted with External Auditors Yes 
 
52 36.88% 
 No  89 63.12% 
 n  141 100.00% 
 
n Mean (S.D.) 
 
Age 141 34.49 (12.75)  

















Pilot Tests Changes Across Time 
Pilot 
Test Independent Variables 
Within/ 
Between 
Participant Participants Changes from Previous Pilot 
1 
a. Variation of Audit Procedures, 
Narcissism, Auditor Extent Framing 
b. Variation of Audit Procedures, 
Narcissism, Compensation Framing Between Students n/a 
2 
a. Variation of Audit Procedures, 
Narcissism, Auditor Extent Framing 
b. Variation of Audit Procedures, 
Narcissism, Compensation Framing Between MTurk No change 
3 
Variation of Audit Procedures, 
Narcissism, Compensation Framing Between MTurk 
1. Wording changes to clarify 
audit procedures 
2. Addition of case 
comprehension questions 
about auditor detection rate 
3. Addition of post-simulation 
question about nature of audit 
procedures preference 
4. Decided to use 
compensation framing as the 
third independent variable 
4 
Variation of Audit Procedures, 
Narcissism, Compensation Framing Within MTurk 
1. Participants were exposed 
to both variation conditions, 
instead of just one condition. 
5 
Variation of Audit Procedures, 
Narcissism Between MTurk 
1. Dropped compensation 
framing as an independent 
variable. 
2. Replaced the word "audit", 
and clarified the wording on 
some post-simulation 
questions 
3. Added an open-ended 
question after the simulation 
to ask about difference in 
actions and preference 
4. Reverted back to one 
variation condition only for 
each participant 
6 
Variation of Audit Procedures, 
Narcissism Within MTurk 
1. Participants were exposed 
to both variation conditions, 










   
Periods Played (N)  908 100.00%    
Periods when Fraud Occurred  394 43.39%    
Periods when Fraud was Not Detected  306 33.70%    






   
Participants that Got Caught by Auditors  88 62.41%    
Participants that Did Not Commit Fraud  32 22.70%    





















FRAUD_OCCURRENCE 141 0 10 2.79 2.00 2.601 
FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION 141 0 1 0.58 0.67 0.39 
PRE_LIKELIHOOD_STEAL 141 0 100 31.17 20.00 30.91 
AMBIGUITY_AVERSION 141 21 65 39.70 39.00 9.75 
NARCISSISM 141 3 15 9.04 9.00 2.40 
STEAL_ATTITUDE 141 5 35 24.99 27.00 5.19 
STEAL_PERC_BEHAVIORAL_CONTR 141 4 28 16.23 16.00 4.93 
STEAL_SUBJECTIVE_NORMS 141 4 19 10.77 10.00 2.45 














  TABLE 4-4   
Cell Means (SD) [n] for Participants' Fraud Occurrence Proportion 
VARIATION_NATURE*NARCISSISM High Low Overall 
Present 0.661 0.496 0.590 
 (0.325) (0.410) (0.370) 
 [38] [29] [67] 
Absent 0.584 0.527 0.562 
 (0.390) (0.429) (0.403) 
 [45] [29] [74] 
Overall 0.620 0.511 0.575 
 (0.361) (0.416) (0.387) 


















  TABLE 4-5    
ANCOVA Analysis: Effect of Variation in the Nature of Audit Procedures and Narcissism on 
Willingness to Commit Fraud 
Model: Dependent variable: FRAUD_OCCURRENCE_PROPORTION (Adjusted R2=0.279) 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
Model 34 45.876 1.349 11.313 <0.001 
Error 872 104.003 0.119   
Corrected Total 906 149.879    
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F value P 
ID 1 1.363 1.363 11.425 0.001 
PERIOD 1 1.509 1.509 12.652 <0.001 
AMBIGUITY_AVERSION 1 2.490 2.490 20.874 <0.001 
GAMBLING 1 0.205 0.205 1.715 0.191 
STEAL_ATTITUDE 1 3.221 3.221 27.010 <0.001 
STEAL_PERC_BEHAVIORAL_CONTR 1 3.681 3.681 30.861 <0.001 
STEAL_SUBJECTIVE_NORMS 1 0.065 0.065 0.547 0.460 
YEARS_WORK_EXPERIENCE_ 1 0.100 0.100 0.842 0.359 
GENDER 1 2.151 2.151 18.032 <0.001 
AGE 1 0.110 0.110 0.919 0.338 
INTERNAL_AUDIT_EXPERIENCE 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.988 
EXTERNAL_AUDIT_EXPERIENCE 1 2.385 2.385 19.995 <0.001 
VARIATION_NATURE 1 0.065 0.065 0.545 0.460 
NARCISSISM 12 9.766 0.814 6.823 <0.001 
VARIATION_NATURE*NARCISSISM 9 6.190 0.688 5.767 <0.001 
Simple effects: 
     


























Simple effect of 
VARIATION_NATURE 
     
under NARCISSISM -Highb 1 0.307 0.307 2.306 0.065 
Simple effect of 
VARIATION_NATURE 
     
under NARCISSISM -Lowb 1 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.471 
b The hypothesis tests are one-tailed tests, therefore the interaction p-values have been halved. All other 





Research Study Materials 
 
Part 1 
Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance Scale-II 
Instructions: Please select an option for each statement that best represents you. Strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (5) 
1. I don’t tolerate ambiguous situations well. 
2. I would rather avoid solving a problem that must be viewed from several different perspectives. 
3. I try to avoid situations that are ambiguous. 
4. I prefer familiar situations to new ones. 
5. Problems that cannot be considered from just one point of view are a little threatening. 
6. I avoid situations that are too complicated for me to easily understand. 
7. I am tolerant of ambiguous situations. 
8. I enjoy tackling problems that are complex enough to be ambiguous. 
9. I try to avoid problems that don’t seem to have only one “best” solution. 
10. I generally prefer novelty over familiarity. 
11. I dislike ambiguous situations. 
12. I find it hard to make a choice when the outcome is uncertain. 
13. I prefer a situation in which there is some ambiguity. 
Narcissism Spectrum Scale (NSS) 
Instructions: On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5(strongly agree), indicate how much you agree or 
disagree with each item. 
 
4. I secretly believe I’m better than most people. 
5. Obstacles rarely slow me down. 
6. I’m great at a lot of things compared to most people. 
7. I press on even in challenging tasks. 
8. I know there’s something special about me. 
9. It’s hard for me to enjoy compliments. 
10. I’m self-confident, but caring. 
11. I don’t like to talk about myself. 





Theory of Planned Behavior Questionnaire 
1. For me to take an item from my employer is  
a) Good - Bad (7-point scale) 
b) Pleasant - Unpleasant (7-point scale) 
c) Foolish - Wise (7-point scale) 
d) Useful - Useless (7-point scale) 
e) Attractive - Unattractive (7-point scale) 
2. If I take an item from my employer, most of the people who are important to me would (Not Care - 
Disapprove, 7-point scale) 
3. No one who is important to me thinks it is OK to take an item from my employer. (Agree - 
Disagree, 7-point scale) 
4. Most people who are important to me will look down on me if I take an item from my employer. 
(Likely - Unlikely, 7-point scale) 
5. For me to take an item from my employer is (Easy - Difficult, 7-point scale) 
6. If I want to, I can take an item from my employer (Definitely True - Definitely False, 7-point 
scale) 
7. I can imagine times when I might take an item from my employer even if I hadn’t planned to. 
(Likely - Unlikely, 7-point scale) 
8. Even if I had a good reason, I could not bring myself to take an item from my employer. (Likely -  
Unlikely, 7-point scale) 
Gambling Habits Questionnaire 
During the past 12 months, how often have you bet/gambled, even casually, for money or valuables in the 
following ways? Not at all (1) to Once a Week or More (4) 
1. Card games (such as poker, blackjack) 
2. Personal skill games (such as pool, darts, coin tossing, video games) 
3. Betting on sports 
4. Lottery (such as scratch cards, numbers, lotto) 
5. Bingo 
6. Dice games 
7. Gambling machines 
8. Horse racing 
9. Online (internet) gambling 
10. Dominoes 
11. Personal challenges (like a dare) 










3. Years of working experience 
4. During your work experience, have you interacted with internal auditors? (Yes/No) 
5. External auditors are responsible for making sure the company’s financial reporting is accurately 




Piccolo Processors, Inc. is a company that manufactures and ships computer processor products to its 
clients. The company has two warehouses - Warehouse A and Warehouse B. For this case, please assume 
you are an employee of Piccolo, and that your job requires you to spend time at both warehouses. 
  
This simulation will last for multiple periods. For every period you remain employed by Piccolo 
Processors, you will be compensated 5 Lira. With access to both warehouses, it is possible for you to take 
a computer processor from either warehouse in each period. Each item you take can be sold on the black 
market for 20 Lira. 
  
Piccolo Processors employs auditors to periodically verify inventory. Processors are kept in five different 
bins in each warehouse (see picture below). In the past, auditors have verified inventory at both 
warehouses. In other words, to detect missing computer processors, the auditors randomly select one bin 
from Warehouse A and one bin from Warehouse B and perform a count to verify the number of 
processors. Thus, there is a 20% chance that the auditors will detect that a processor is missing.  
  
If you choose to take a processor from Warehouse A or Warehouse B, you will be terminated from your 
position if the auditors detect that the processor is missing. If you are terminated, you will keep all salary 
earned previously. In addition, you will keep the value of the processors you successfully removed from 
the warehouses. However, you will not be compensated for the period in which you were terminated, and 
you will be unable to continue the simulation.  
  
At the conclusion of this simulation, you will be compensated based upon the Lira awarded. The 




When auditors verify inventory at Warehouse A and Warehouse B: 
In the past, auditors have verified inventory at both warehouses. Consistent with what they have been 
doing in the past, the auditors will split their time between two warehouses.  
  
Processors are kept in five different bins in each warehouse (see picture below). To detect missing 
computer processors, the auditors will randomly select two bins and perform a count to verify that all 




inventory. Consequently, you estimate that there is a 20% chance that a missing processor will be detected 
by the auditors. 
 
Each period will proceed as follows: 
 1. You will decide whether to take a computer processor from one of the five bins in Warehouse A, take a 
processor from one of the five bins in Warehouse B, or not take a processor at all. 
 
 2. You will learn the results of the inventory verification. In other words, you will learn whether the 
auditors discovered a missing processor (if one was taken). 
______________________________________________________ 
 
When auditors verify inventory at Warehouse A or Warehouse B: 
 
In the past, auditors have verified inventory at both warehouses. Moving forward, the auditors will spend 
all of their time at one warehouse (though it is impossible to predict which warehouse).  
 
Processors are kept in five different bins in each warehouse (see picture below). To detect missing 
computer processors, the auditors randomly select two bins in a warehouse and perform a count to verify 
the number of processors. That is, they will randomly select two bins from their chosen warehouse and 
zero bins in the other warehouse when verifying inventory. Consequently, you estimate that there is a 40% 
chance that a missing processor will be detected at the warehouse the auditors select, and 0% chance that a 
missing processor will be detected at the warehouse the auditors do not select. 
 
Each period will proceed as follows: 
 
 1. You will decide whether to take a computer processor from one of the five bins in Warehouse A, take a 
processor from one of the five bins in Warehouse B, or not take a processor at all. 
 
2. You will learn the results of the inventory verification. In other words, you will learn which 




If the auditors use these procedures, what is the likelihood that you would take a processor from either 
warehouse? (Unlikely-Likely, 0-100) 
 
Comprehension Questions 
1. In this simulation, you have access to which warehouse? 
o Warehouse A 
o Warehouse B 
o Both warehouses 
 
2. How many warehouses will the auditors perform inventory verification at per period? 
o One 
o Two 




3.  What is your salary per period?  
o 5 Lira 
o 20 Lira 
o 50 Lira 
 
4. A computer processor taken from either warehouse is worth             Lira.? 
o 5 Lira 
o 10 Lira 
o 20 Lira 
 
Variation Absent Condition 
5. The auditors split their time between warehouses and perform inventory verification at Warehouse 
A and Warehouse B. How many bins will they choose to verify in Warehouse B? 
o 5 bins 
o 4 bins 
o 3 bins 
o 2 bins 
o 1 bins 
o No bins 
 
 
Variation Present Condition 
5. The auditors spend all their time at one warehouse, and perform inventory verification at 
Warehouse A or Warehouse B. If the auditors randomly select Warehouse B, how many bins will 
they choose to verify in Warehouse B? 
o 5 bins 
o 4 bins 
o 3 bins 
o 2 bins 
o 1 bin 
o No bins 
 
6. The auditors spend all their time at one warehouse, and perform inventory verification at 
Warehouse A or Warehouse B. If the auditors randomly select Warehouse B, how many bins will 
they choose to verify in Warehouse A? 
o 5 bins 
o 4 bins 
o 3 bins 
o 2 bins 
o 1 bin 









Period n (Audit in Both Warehouses) 
You know that the auditors will split their time between Warehouse A and Warehouse B this period. In 
other words, they will select one bin from Warehouse A and one bin from Warehouse B. Do you choose to 
take a processor from one of the warehouses? 
o Yes- Bin 1 of Warehouse A 
o Yes- Bin 2 of Warehouse A 
o Yes- Bin 3 of Warehouse A 
o Yes- Bin 4 of Warehouse A 
o Yes- Bin 5 of Warehouse A 
o Yes- Bin 1 of Warehouse B 
o Yes- Bin 2 of Warehouse B 
o Yes- Bin 3 of Warehouse B 
o Yes- Bin 4 of Warehouse B 
o Yes- Bin 5 of Warehouse B 
o No, I choose not to take a processor from either warehouse 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Period n (Audit in One Warehouse) 
You know that the auditors will spend all their time at one warehouse this period. In other words, they will 
select two bins from the chosen warehouse and no bins from the other warehouse. However, you do not 
know if they will conduct inventory verification at Warehouse A or Warehouse B. Do you choose to take 
a processor from one of the warehouses? 
o Yes- Bin 1 of Warehouse A 
o Yes- Bin 1 of Warehouse A 
o Yes- Bin 2 of Warehouse A 
o Yes- Bin 3 of Warehouse A 
o Yes- Bin 4 of Warehouse A 
o Yes- Bin 5 of Warehouse A 
o Yes- Bin 1 of Warehouse B 
o Yes- Bin 2 of Warehouse B 
o Yes- Bin 3 of Warehouse B 
o Yes- Bin 4 of Warehouse B 
o Yes- Bin 5 of Warehouse B 




If participants indicate that they will choose to take a processor from one of the bins: 
What do you believe is the likelihood that the missing processor will be detected by the auditors? (0-
100%) 
 
If participants indicate that they choose not to take a processor at all: 
Assume you did take a processor. What do you believe is the likelihood that the missing processor will be 






Attention Check Question before Period 6 Begins 
In this simulation, you have the chance to take inventory from which warehouse? 
o Warehouse A 
o Warehouse B 
o Both warehouses 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Results of the Audit if Participants Chose Not to Commit Fraud (Both warehouses) 
The auditors split their time at both warehouses but you did not choose to take a processor this period. 
You will now proceed to the next period. 
 
Results of the Audit if Participants Chose to Commit Fraud and it was Detected (Both warehouses) 
You chose to take a computer processor. However, Piccolo Processors, Inc.’s auditors split their time 
between both warehouses when verifying inventory and discovered the missing processor. 
 
You will not be paid a salary for this period, and your employment with Piccolo Processors is terminated 
immediately. However, you will keep all salary from previous periods and the value of any processors you 
previously took. 
 
Results of the Audit if Participants Chose to Commit Fraud and it was Not Detected (Both warehouses) 
You chose to take a computer processor. The auditors split their time between both warehouses when 
verifying inventory but the missing processor was not detected. Accordingly, you will earn an additional 
20 Lira compensation for this period. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Results of the Audit if Participants Chose Not to Commit Fraud (One warehouse- Audited A[B]) 
This period, Piccolo Processors, Inc.’s auditors spent all their time verifying inventory at Warehouse A 
[B]. You will now proceed to the next period. 
 
Results of the Audit if Participants Chose to Commit Fraud and it was Detected (One warehouse- Audited 
A[B]) 
Piccolo Processors, Inc’s auditors chose to spend all their time verifying inventory at Warehouse A[B]. 
 
You chose to take a computer processor at Warehouse A[B]. However, Piccolo Processors, Inc.’s auditors 
performed inventory verification and discovered the missing processor. 
 
You will lose all of your compensation for this period and your employment with Piccolo Processors, Inc. 
is terminated immediately. You will not be paid a salary for this period. However, you will keep all salary 
from previous periods and the value of any processors you previously took. 
 
Results of the Audit if Participants Chose to Commit Fraud and it was Not Detected (One warehouse- 
Audited A[B])- Auditors Audited the Exact Warehouse that Participants Chose to Steal from 
Piccolo Processors, Inc.’s auditors verified inventory at Warehouse A[B]. 
 
You chose to take a computer processor. The auditors performed inventory verification, but the missing 






Results of the Audit if Participants Chose to Commit Fraud and it was Not Detected (One warehouse- 
Audited A[B]) Auditors Audited a Different Warehouse that Participants Chose to Steal from 
Piccolo Processors, Inc.’s auditors verified inventory at Warehouse A[B]. 
 
You chose to take a computer processor. The missing processor could not be detected as the auditors did 
not verify inventory at Warehouse B[A]. Accordingly, you will earn an additional 20 Lira compensation 
for this period. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
(All) Process Measures Questions 
1. In which of the following situations would you rather take a processor? 
o The auditors split their time verifying inventory at both Warehouse A and Warehouse B. 
They randomly select one bin from each of the warehouses. 
o The auditors spend all their time verifying inventory at only one warehouse, though you do 
not know which one will be selected. Auditors will randomly select two bins at the chosen 
warehouse and none at the other warehouse. 
 
2. Assume that the auditors spent all their time verifying inventory at one [two] warehouses, selecting 
two [one] bins from the chosen warehouse [and none from the other]. How worried were you that 
the missing computer processor would be detected? (Sliding scale. 1 to 11, with 11 being very 
worried) 
 
3. It is important to me to feel superior over the company and its controls (Strongly Disagree-
Strongly Agree, 7-point scale). 
 
4. It is important to me to feel superior over the company and its controls. (Strongly Disagree-
Strongly Agree, 7-point scale). 
 
5. I am confident that I can beat the odds and successfully avoid detection by the auditors when 
taking a processor (Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree, 7-point scale). 
 
6. We have noticed in previous studies that many people say they would prefer to take processors 
when auditors split their time between warehouses, but they are actually more likely to take 
processors when auditors spend all of their time at one warehouse. In your opinion, why do you 





CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
Summary and Contributions 
 This dissertation examines fraud occurrence and audit intervention from three different perspectives: 
(1) the perpetrator, (2) the auditor, and (3) auditor interventions that could deter perpetrators from 
committing fraud. The three papers aim to offer contributions to both literature and practice. 
 The first study examines whether the rationalization attribute of the fraud triangle applies to 
individuals with high levels of trait impulsivity. According to the fraud triangle theory, all three attributes of 
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization have to be present when individuals decide to engage in a 
fraudulent act (Albrecht 1991). This study adds to the literature by using a different tool, MouselabWEB, to 
look at the different factors that individuals’ are focused on when making decisions to engaged in or refrain 
from fraud. With the tool, I was able to record the amount of time individuals spent on the different pieces 
of information presented to them and to infer whether they took the time to neutralize their behavior before 
making the decision to engage in fraud behaviors. The results of the study suggest that when opportunity 
and pressure are present, impulsive individuals are quicker with decision making than non-impulsive 
individuals. Impulsive individuals seem to bypass considerations about the potential consequences of the 
fraud. These findings should be of interest to forensic accounting and fraud examination researchers and 
anti-fraud professionals as they better understand fraud perpetrators and work to introduce a better fraud 
model. 
 The second study investigates how first impressions and auditor mindsets interact to influence 
auditors’ risk assessments. Prior first impression research suggests that individuals’ first impressions can 
influence their subsequent judgments (Olivola and Todorov 2010). Combined with the fact that first 
impressions are subconsciously formed almost instantaneously (Willis and Todorov 2006), it could be 
difficult for auditors to overcome biased judgments associated with first impressions. Time pressure may 




124 auditors suggest that when auditors are in the efficiency mindset, they are more swayed by first 
impressions than auditors in the effectiveness mindset, valuing the risk that the inventory account is 
materially misstated as lower when their impression of the client personnel is positive and higher when their 
impression of the client personnel is negative. When auditors are in the effectiveness mindset, the valuation 
of the risk of material misstatement of the inventory account does not differ between positive and negative 
first impression conditions. These findings have practical implications for auditors and suggest that firms 
should consider having audit supervisors remind auditors to stay effective when conducting audit tasks to 
mitigate first impression biases. 
 Lastly, the third study explores how auditors can use individuals’ aversion to ambiguity to their 
advantage and assist in the efforts to deter fraud by varying the nature of audit procedures from year to year. 
Changing the nature of audit procedures makes the audit plan less predictable and may lead to less fraud 
attempts by individuals who are looking to exploit areas that auditors have traditionally overlooked during 
the audit. Narcissistic individuals are perceived by auditors to pose a greater fraud risk (Johnson et al. 2013) 
and are more likely to attempt to complete a task when it is perceived to be challenging; in short, they 
pursue challenging tasks because they perceive that others are not able to achieve success with those same 
tasks and they have the need to feel superior over others (Raskin and Terry 1988). Variation in the nature of 
audit procedures could be a simple audit intervention that leads to fraud deterrence. However if narcissists 
perceive the variation in the nature of audit procedures to be a challenge, they might attempt to commit 
fraud just to feel superior over the company’s controls and its auditors. Results do not show a difference 
between the rate of fraud occurrence when variation in the nature of audit procedures are absent or present. 
However, when the auditors vary the nature of audit procedures, individuals perceive the risk of detection to 
be higher even when the rate of detection between the variation and non-variation conditions are the same. 




vary the nature of audit procedures than when the auditors stick to the same audit plan from year to year. 
This has practical implications for auditors and audit policy makers as audit standards currently call for 
auditors to vary the audit procedures when there is a risk of material misstatement due to fraud. Following 
the recommendations of auditing standards to vary the nature of audit procedures might lead to a higher 
occurrence of fraud if individuals are narcissistic. Auditors should be aware of the different effects of 
variation in the nature of audit procedures for narcissistic and non-narcissistic individuals when designing 
audit plans. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 Future research can extend each of the three papers. The first study contributes to the literature by 
focusing on the impulsivity trait of individuals and how that trait can influence the way individuals approach 
fraud when the opportunity to benefit from a fraud is present. This study adds to the fraud literature by 
providing the foundation for future fraud models that include impulsive individuals. The results from this 
study can also contribute to future studies on concealment as concealment methods would differ for 
individuals who take time to deliberate before engaging in a fraud act than for individuals who decide to 
engage in fraud acts first before trying to conceal their actions. Future research may also examine 
concealment strategies of impulsive versus non-impulsive individuals. The second study extends the 
psychology and auditing literature by showing that auditors can overcome first impression biases by being 
in the effectiveness mindset. Future research can investigate how other personality traits such as self-esteem, 
extroversion-introversion, and professional skepticism interact with first impression biases to influence risk 
assessments and audit judgments. Lastly, the third study contributes to literature by providing initial 
evidence related to individuals’ perception of fraud detection when auditors vary the nature of audit 
procedures. The study provides evidence that narcissistic individuals may see auditors’ attempts at varying 




auditors do not make changes to nature of audit procedures. Future research can look into how changing the 
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